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P R E F A C E
This manuscript has a long history. It deals with matters 
that I have wrestled with for at least 25 years. But which I have 
only come to understand perhaps in the last year or so. This is 
not to say that I understand them fully now. Indeed, in terms of 
comprehension of the dynamics of social change in my own environ­
ment —  the Caribbean —  I can claim now only to see a glimmer. Not 
the light.
But in order for us to move forward, a glimmer is better than 
no light at all.
The manuscript has a long bureaucratic history. It was first 
floated by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America 
(ECLA) in January 1973* By January 1974, I was still not sure 
whether the ECIA would be going through with the project. This was 
cleared up by February 1, 1974 —  with a request that my report be 
ready by May 1974.
At first, I thought it possible to meet the U.N. deadline with 
a "formula approach". Essentially, a report that would say what 
everyone knows already. A report that would benefit nobody except 
the * consultant* who received a fee. But I was intellectually 
excited by the proposal.
The following is a verbatim reproduction of the ECLA proposal.
V
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SOCIAL STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING 
CARIBBEAN; OUTLINE FOR RESEARCH PROJECT
1. The project would be exploratory, conducted by one consultant 
during a three-month period. It would draw upon the findings of 
whatever relevant investigations can be unearthed, on available 
statistics, and on discussions with informed persons. In view of 
the limited time and resources it would require a consultant already 
familiar with the topic.
2. The immediate purpose would be to obtain a fund of information 
and interpretation concerning social structural change in the 
English-speaking Caribbean countries comparable to that now being 
built up by ECLA for Latin America and usable in the periodic 
surveys of social change now planned. The longer-term purpose would 
be to develop hypotheses concerning relations between social, 
economic and political change for testing in subsequent investigations. 
The project would not include field research, but the report would be 
expected to include concrete proposals concerning research priorities 
and methods. The consultant should aim at a report of 100-150 pages, 
with copies of statistical and other source material not readily 
available elsewhere appended.
3. The project should cover the following topics (the consultant 
would be free to use his own judgement concerning their relative 
importance, the possibility of making meaningful statements on the 
basis of existing information, and the desirability of including 
additional topics);
a. Historical evolution of plantation society and 
economy; the typical social structure that has 
emerged. (This should be a brief introduction 
referring to published sources.)
b. Implications of recent economic, political, social 
and demographic changes and continuing constraints:
i) Social structural consequences of change 
in economic activities and appearance of 
new activities:
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- The plantations: changes in forms of 
ownership, production techniques, markets, 
demands for labour, contacts with rest of 
the economy.
- Peasant agriculture: changes in markets, 
production techniques, land availability, 
contacts with the rest of the economy.




(Footnote on p. 43 of Persistent Poverty 
offers a significant lead for this 
discussion.)
ii) Social structural consequences of economic
openness within small specialized economies:
- Income expectations.
- Consumption expectations.
iii) Social structural consequence of political 
independence:
Growth and diversification of the 
bureaucracy.
- Needs for planners and other 
specialists of national origin.
- Growth of political parties and 
interest-group organizations.
iv) Social structural consequences of the educational 
systems :
- Education following external models and 
reflecting prestige of the culture of 
the dominant centre.
- Education as the main channel for 
upward mobility.
- Educational crisis when the previous 
models are challenged and when the 
occupational structures cannot meet the 
expectations of the "educated".
v) Social structural consequences of ideological 
penetration, dependency, incompatibility 
between local realities and imported ideologies:
- Continuing intellectual dependence on 
the "mother country"; distorted impact 
of changes in the "mother country" 
itself.
- Developmentalist ideologies and planning 
recipes: difficulties of application
in very small, open and dependent 
economies.
- Revolutionary ideologies and problems 
of their adaptations: Marxism, "Black 
power".
vi) Social structural consequences of ethnic 
diversity:
- Occupational division of labour and 
rivalries.
- Competing nationalisms and different 
external models.
vii) Social structural consequences of demographic 
change:
- Population increase and pressure on 
the land.
- Urbanization and rejection of the "rural".
- International migration; consequences 
for potential leadership, skilled labour 
supply, age and sex distribution, income 
from remittances of migrants, cultural 
influence of contact with migrants and 
returned migrants.
Similarities and differences in relation to the Latin 
American republics. (Social Change and Social 
Development policy in Latin America could serve as 
basis for a short discussion.
Hypotheses or conclusions concerning the predominant 
directions of societal change, compatibiliiy or 
incompatibility of these with a viable and acceptable 
style of development, feasible strategies for different 
lines of change, possible agents of such strategies.
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e. Evaluation of information now available concerning 
the above topics; priorities in research; proposals 
for means of improving information at reasonable 
cost (in terms of specialized human resources as
well as money) and making it readily usable
policy makers and change agents.
The intellectual excitement of the proposal needs no 
elaboration. Operating out of the purely intellectual mould, I
have violated bureaucratic (and my own) deadlines over and over
again.
What follows is a semi-intellectual-bureaucratic product.
I have rushed through matters which require years of intellectual 
deliberation.
If the product is considered intellectually worthwhile, part 
of the credit goes to my colleagues in the University of the West 
Indies —  particularly those in Economics and Political Science.
If it is satisfactory for the international bureaucracy, that would 
be fine —  the gravy, so to speak.
Nevertheless, I wish to express appreciation to Marshall Wolfe 
of the ECLA (Santiago Office) for affording me this rather unique 
opportunity to think through and to set out on paper, the basic 
parameters for change in my society.
December 197^»
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C H A P T E R  I

THE SOCIAL FRAMEWORK
Contemporary West Indian society is a product of slavery and 
the plantation system of social organization. Every institution 
testifies to this. So too do the values, attitudes, traditions, and 
beliefs of the people. Any analysis of the present situation must 
begin with a recognition of this.
The present analysis of "social structural change" in the 
region is, therefore, developed in this context. Accordingly, in this 
opening chapter we present the bare outlines of that social framework.
Slave society centred on the plantation which had the features 
of a total institution. White European owners and managers presided 
over an operation that involved the forced labour of numerous black 
African people to produce sugar. African peoples were forcibly 
transported from their homeland and re-socialized as slaves in the 
New World. After being subjected to a process of "seasoning" to bend 
their characters to the needs of plantation work, the Africans were 
thrown together in batches consisting of different tribal cultures 
on individual plantations. Thereafter, they were forced to adapt 
the language and culture of their European masters. The Afro- 
saxonization of the transplanted African began from that time on.
Race was institutionalized from the very outset. A rigid caste 
system separated whites from blacks in slave society. After a time 
an intermediate group of 'brown* people (mulattos) developed from 
the illicit sexual encounters of blacks and whites. The mulattos 
were afforded better opportunities to assimilate European culture 
than the blacks; and by virtue of that, and their skin colour, were 
afforded higher social status.
Social structure typically reflects the distribution of economic 
power. In slave society the white people monopolized economic power. 
Accordingly, all social institutions were controlled and manipulated 
by them —  state apparatus, church, school, etc. What was called 
"representative government" was a government representing the planters 
slaves had no representation. Church was the church of the planters; 
African religious rites were ruthlessly suppressed. And so on.
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Emancipation of the slaves only modified the pattern of social 
organization. Since economic power remained firmly in the hands of 
the white planters, the social structure remained intact. The 
first modification came in response to the violently expressed 
demands of the ex-slaves for land and justice. The Crown intervened 
and planters representative government was replaced by Crown Colony 
government. The Crown, it was argued would govern on behalf of all 
the people. Yet the terms which qualified individuals for 
participating in the political process were based on the ownership 
of property. So, in effect, the Crown governed on behalf of the 
planters who continued to monopolize property.
The economically dominant white planter class continued to 
dominate the social structure. Race determined the economic well 
being of individuals. Whiteness was a passport to wealth; and 
blackness to poverty. Social status was determined by race and 
colour. Whites remained on ihe top of the social hierarchy, 
mulattos in the middle and blacks at the bottom. East Indians 
indentured labour came in to join the black Africans at the bottom 
of the social ladder.
The system of education developed during Crown Colony rule 
provided new opportunities for the social mobility of Africans and 
East Indians. The system was transplanted from England. And it 
was the chief mechanism by which non-whites came more fully to 
assimilate European culture. Acquisition of education increased 
mobility in two ways: it improved the income opportunity of the
individual and enhanced his status by virtue of a capácity to be like 
a European. Thus elements of class entered the social matrix. 
Economic status and cultural attributes became linked with the exist­
ing race and colour dimensions of earlier slave society to define 
the structural bases of contemporary West Indian society.
Educational opportunities were open only to a few. The 
majority of people had to continue the struggle for ¡land and for 
securing a decent level of living from wage work. This struggle was 
heightened during the 1930's when riots broke out throughout the 
region. Official response was a retreat from Crown Colony government
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to universal adult representative government.—' This set the stage 
for the transition to constitutional independence.
Constitutional advances adjusted the legal framework but left 
the economic base intact. Economic power remains concentrated in 
the hands of foreign and local whites. So the social structure 
remains roughly the same as before; the modifications that are 
evident reflect the diversification and growth of the economies 
which enhance occupational mobility. Additionally, educational 
opportunities expanded with constitutional advances; thus broadening 
the base for mobility by that route.
The postwar diversification and growth of West Indian economies 
involved the emergence of new activities like manufacturing, tourism, 
mining etc., and the growth of urban centres. Demand for skilled 
labour expanded with the growth of construction, transportation, etc. 
An urban working class came into prominence. Distinctions now have 
to he drawn between "white collar", "blue collar" and "unskilled" 
elements of that class. The peasants and rural proletariat (wage 
workers) remain hut the overall class structure is now more 
complexified than before the war.
Race, colour and class now have equal prominence in the social
order. M.G. Smith has described West Indian society as being plural
—  consisting of white, brown and black elements, each of which has
a different culture, institutional pattern and political orientation.
Each stratum of the three elements is said to have its own life
2/style, values and social relationships. The thesis has been 
challenged by other Caribbean analysts who point to the existence 
of a set of values which are shared by all three layers identified 
by Smith. Furthermore, the plural society thesis fails to recognize 
the vastly expanded mobility between the ’black lower1 and the ’brown
if Universal adult suffrage was first introduced in Jamaica in 
I944 and subsequently in the rest of West Indian colonies.
2/ M.G. Smith, The Plural Society in the British West Indies 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles, "1965).
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middle* strata in those societies that have experienced rapid 
industrialization.
By and large the middle class is no longer the exclusive 
preserve of brown-skinned persons. Education and skilled blue collar 
work opportunities have brought significantly large numbers of black 
people into the ranks of the middle class. Even if the distinction 
is made between "upper middle" (professional, technical and clerical) 
and "lower middle":(skilled workers), the upper middle cannot be 
described as exclusively brown.
It is true of course that there is a high correlation between 
colour and occupational status. The upper class consists almost 
exclusively of whites (including Jews, Syrians, Lebanese, etc.); and 
as we descend to social hierarchy the concentration becomes 
increasingly black. So that the "lower lower" class (i.e. unemployed 
people) are almost exclusively black. The reason for this is that 
these societies systematically discriminate in favour of persons of 
lighter complexion. In private sector, job selection, for example, 
foreign whites, local whites and non-black minorities (e.g. Chinese) 
are given preference over black people with equal skills. ^
The basic institutions of West Indian society to-day reflect
the dominance of European culture. The legal framework is based on
British Common Law. (indeed, many of the laws on the Statute books
were enacted by planter representative governments and clearly
4/discriminate against black people and workers generally. —/ The 
educational system is distinctly British with emphasis on grammar 
school type of training to the exclusion of vocational inputs. The 
Church is of England and of Rome. The political system is that of 
Westminister; the model being enshrined in the constitutions of the
See, for example, Jack Harewood, Racial Discrimination in 
Employment in Trinidad and Tobago; and Acton Camejo, Racial 
Discrimination in Employment in the Private Sector in Trinidad & 
Tobago, in Social and Economic Studies, Sept. 1971*
4/ Laws governing trade union organization, for example, are 
designated "Master and Servants" laws.
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independent states. And the life styles of all groups reflect 
varying degrees of assimilation of the cultures of Europe and 
North America.
The status of individuals in society in normal inter-personal 
transactions is determined by not only race and colour but other 
ascriptive characteristics like manner of speech and of dress.
The closer these are to the European norms, the higher the status 
accorded. As a corollary cultural manifestations of Africa and 
India are generally despised. ^  Social mobility, therefore, 
requires a divorce of African and Indian culture and assimilation 
of that of Europe. The result is a continuous process of Afro- 
saxonization and Indo-saxonization of West Indian peoples.
Because the societies are culturally oriented to Europe and 
North America, and the economies controlled from those sources, 
the leadership at all levels of society is comprised almost 
exclusively of the Saxonized elements. In school, church, state, 
trade unions, farm organizations, etc., leadership is elitist and 
the elitism is based heavily on the capacity of leadership to move 
freely among European and pseudo-European officialdom. The bias 
pervades all levels of society; not just the middle class as some 
analysts seem to suggest. The point is that although different 
segments of West Indian society display different cultural attributes, 
all groups generally aspire in one way or another and certainly accept 
European cultural norms as superior. ^
Economic policy, consumer tastes and the general value system 
reflect this cultural dependency. It is this cultural dependency 
that perpetuates economic and political dependency. Thus we find
5/ Some legitimation of African culture recently has been 
accorded. But only for superficial manifestations of that culture. 
Although dress is acceptable to some extent, religion is not. And 
West Indians still despise our own language wbich is a blend of 
African dialects and English.
6/ This must he qualified by the recognition of small groups, 
such as Rastafari, who completely reject European culture and have 
created their own brand of African culture.
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economies which are functionally a passive part of an overseas 
economic system —  societies that produce what they do not consume 
and that consume what they do not produce. Appendage economies 
hinged on to the world capitalist system and depending on stimuli 
from outside to promote economic change. It is being argued here 
that this results not from so-called limitations of size hut from 
deliberate choices made by official policy makers; both bureaucratic 
and political policy makers in the Vest Indies have been thoroughly
brainwashed (socialized) by the "myth of resource insufficiency" as
1 /a direct consequence of cultural dependency. —' Accordingly, only 
policies which fit into the existing framework of neo-colonial 
economic relations are contemplated.
Dependence generates backward economic growth, a condition in 
which the economy expands hut without benefiting the majority of
g /thé population. That is the present trend of change in the 
West Indies. The political process reinforces this trend. There 
are of course, currents in the contemporary situation which are 
moving towards a reversal of that trend. The increased relative 
importance of young people, growing unemployment, increasing 
disaffection with existing political organizations, rising costs 
of living, urbanization, etc., are contributing to a general 
reassessment of the situation by significantly large segments of 
the population.
The present study explores some of the dimensions of the 
dominant trends in West Indian society over the past two decades 
or so. Aspects of the social framework outlined in this chapter 
will receive further elaboration in some of the chapters that 
follow.
7/ See the stimulating paper by Louis Lindsay "Colonialism 
and the Myth of Resource Insufficiency in Jamaica" (i.S.E.R., U.W.I.) 
mimeo, March 197^.
8/ For more discussion on the causality asserted see 
George L. Beckford (ed) Caribbean Economy: Dependence and 
Backwardness (Kingston, 1975)«
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The basis of this study is how people utilize their resources.
It is assumed that people are important. Accordingly, we are 
concerned about how they live. How they utilize resources to 
satisfy their needs. In the Caribbean these needs are basic.
Food, shelter and health.
In order to satisfy needs in any society, resources have to be 
transformed into the goods and services people want. Therefore the 
economics of a situation is critical. But economics does not exist 
lay itself. Economics of any situation is dictated by the particular 
rules of the game. By the kind of society. By the kind of politics. 
By the kind of people.
That is to say, a study of any human society must be grounded 
in the realities of the particular social system. Social in the 
broadest sense. And system because every society has some order.
This study of West Indian Society, therefore, begins with a 
survey of the economy. Of West Indian resources and the exploitation 
(use) of them. Concern is with people, resources and production. 
Accordingly the concern must be extended to exchange; because all 
people cannot produce their particular needs. Some produce some 
things and exchange them for other things which are produced by 
somebody else. The mode of exchange therefore, is as important as 
the mode of production.
West Indian society begins and ends with production and 
exchange. The Marxian framework of analysis helps to explain why 
the production process leaves West Indian people poor. The 
Emmanuel framework of analysis helps to explain why the exchange 
process leaves the worker in the cane barefooted and poor. Our 
tentative attempt in this exercise is to integrate the two frameworks. 
To try to explain the poverty of West Indian people; and what they 
are likely to do about it.
Like every social analysis, the ideas here are tentative. We 
cannot predict with certainty human behaviour. Part of the 
difficulty derives from an absence of information. Information 
informs. The reader will therefore notice that more attention is
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given to Jamaica than the rest of the English Caribbean. The 
reason is that there is more information (investigation) about 
Jamaica. But I am of the opinion that the general conclusions 
arrived at are representative of the capitalist Caribbean.
C H A P T E R  II

- 9 -
EVOLUTION AND STRUCTURE 
OF WEST INDIAN ECONOMY
Before Europe invaded the New World in the 15th century, the 
Caribbean islands were inhabited by two main tribes of indigenous 
Indians. The warlike Caribs and the peaceful Arawaks.
The original economy was based essentially on shifting agriculture, 
hunting and fishing. Over time the Caribs conquered territory from 
the Arawaks. And the latter kept moving northward in the process. 
Accordingly, by the time Colombus came, Arawaks were more concentrated 
in the northernmost islands.
Arawak economy was somewhat more organized than that of the Carib. 
Agriculture was better organized and fishing relatively well developed. 
Carib economy, on the other hand, was more of a war economy. 
Specialization was in hunting and weapon manufactures. Arawak economy 
was more diversified than Carib economy.
The invading Europeans transformed the Caribbean scene. There 
were no precious metals, like the gold and silver of the mainland 
(the Spanish Main). But the islands were strategic bases for the 
plunder of the Main. And the soils were suitable for producing 
"exotic” tropical commodities - sugar, cotton, indigo, tobacco, etc.
After the Papal Bull, Brazil fell to Portugal while Spain got 
the rest of Latin America. The Portuguese introduced plantation sugar 
in Brazil in the 16th Century. Thereafter King Sugar spread northward, 
like the Arawaks earlier, first to Barbados, and later up to Jamaica 
and Cuba.
The history of contenqjorary West Indian economy is rooted in 
sugar and slavery.
The indigenous Indian populations were harnessed by the conquering 
Europeans to provide plantation labour. But they did not survive the 
hazards of permanent agriculture. And the European diseases took a 
heavy toll on them. No Arawaks have survived to this day. And the 
Caribs are now few in number. ^
l/ Pockets of Carib people can be found to-day in places like 
Dominica where the mountainous terrain provided a hamlet for their 
safe withdrawal from the European invaders.
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Millions of Africans were brought over to the Caribbean to 
provide the labour power needed for plantation production. And 
to-day Black People are the bulk of West Indian populations.
Slave economy persisted from the 16th to the 19th century —  
some three hundred years or so. Emancipation came in 1838. And as 
Black People (the Africans) set about to make themselves independent 
of the brutal plantation, labour became scarce. So east Indians 
were brought under the indenture system, up until about 1917 when 
the Indian government terminated this scheme of semi-slavery.
To-day East Indians are a high proportion of the population of the 
new plantation colonies, like Trinidad and Guyana. ^
Contemporary West Indian economy is more diversified than was 
slave economy. To-day, there is mining, manufacturing, tourism, and 
peasant agriculture. Plantation sugar remains as well.
Diversification, yes. But there is a great deal of structural 
continuity in the system. Later in this chapter, there will be 
occasion to support this assertion. A series of Tables provide the 
data there. But before that, we discuss the Caribbean in terms of 
the world economy.
I CARIBBEAN IN WORLD ECONOMY
The Caribbean belongs to everybody outside. British, Dutch, 
French, American. There is constitutional independence —  Haiti, 
Cuba, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad-Tobago and 
Guyana. But all are dependent economies. Cuba is tied into the 
international Socialist system of Eastern Europe and the USSR. The 
rest of the Caribbean is tightly locked into the International 
Capitalist System of the USA, Western Europe (and Japan).
Chart 1 is a picture of the world economic systems of to-day. 
The socialist world is split into two components —  East Europe 
and China. The break in relations between China and the Soviet
2/ They are the majority in Guyana and probably half of 
Trinidad’s population.
Chart 1. - The World System of Political Economy, 197^ *
International Capitalist Systems 
______ (Ca. 2/3 Mankind)________
International Socialist Systems 
_______(Ca. 1 /5 Mankind)_______
Third World Nations
* The multinational corporation (MNC) dominates centre-periphery links within the international 
capitalist system. State agreements dominate the socialist links. Socialist links with Third 
World Nations are concentrated (India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, etc.). For further elaboration, 
see Aníbal Pinto & Kñakal, The Centre-Periphery System Twenty Years Later; in Social & Economic 
Studies, March 1973*
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Union in the early I960* s had repercussions on Cuba by I966. Prior 
to 1966, China was the chief source of rice for Cuba. And rice is 
important in the Cuban diet. So that beginning in the late i960's 
Cuba began to seek new sources and to increase its own rice 
production. Guyana is a major rice exporter in the region; and so 
a trade with Cuba developed.
The Cuban economy is linked with Eastern Europe. The Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) is ’’first among equals" in that 
system. Cuban economy is a sugar economy. And the USSR is the 
single largest huyer of Cuban raw sugar. Nickel is the other 
important export in Cuba; and again the USSR is the largest huyer.
In turn Cuba imports manufactures, fuel and capital goods (including 
weapons) from the USSR and the affiliated countries of Eastern Europe.
Cuba has some characteristics of a dependent economy. The
"muscovado bias" of exporting primary commodities is present —  in
sugar, nickel, fish and citrus fruits. "In mid-1968, Castro stated
that numerous socialist countries maintain trade practices with the
underdeveloped world similar to the practices used by the bourgeois,
4/capitalist world." -/
According to one analyst:
Cuba accepted a dependent status in its trade relations with the 
USSR with the hope of receiving fair treatment with respect to terms 
of trade with the Soviets. However, statistical investigation 
accumulated in the 1950’s and 1960’s shows that the USSR has been 
giving preferential trade agreements to the countries of Western
3/ Currently, Cuba is the fourth largest nickel producer in 
the world ".. Cuba is mainly exporting raw nickel to the USSR, which 
refines the ore and re-exports it to the socialist countries and the 
international market - (the USSR is the primary nickel producer in 
the international market)" Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Revolutionary Change 
in Cuba (Pittsburg, 1971) p.315*
4/ Carmelo Mesa-Lago, ibid, p.318.
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Europe as a result of benefits accrued from its trade with Eastern
5 /European countries. —1
From this observation, it would be perhaps fair to describe Cuba as 
a dependent Socialist economy.
The rest of the Caribbean are dependent capitalist economies. 
The English-speaking Caribbean is an extension of "monopoly 
capital". Sugar, mining, tourism, hanking are all controlled by 
foreign enterprise. The multinational corporations (MNCs) control 
the main resource sectors. And some manufacturers as well.
Interest is now concentrated on the English-speaking capitalist
yeconomy, —'
II EVOLUTION OF WEST INDIAN ECONOMY
We begin with slave economy and look at how present day economy 
came into being.
Slave Economy
Slave economy generated no national income; only domestic 
product. Table 1 is a simplified model of transactions in slave 
economy. Transactions are concentrated in the plantation sector 
which is, in reality, an extension of metropolitan economy.
Plantations provision themselves with consumer and capital 
goods. Consumer goods (foodstuffs) are produced by slaves on their 
provision grounds. And capital goods (fuel, lumber, etc.) are 
secured from the forested areas not in sugar production.
5/ Ibid p.319* The author made reference to the following 
article, Horst Mendershausen "Terms of Trade between USSR and 
Smaller Communist Countries, 1955-1957" Review of Economics and 
Statistics, May 1959» pp.l06-118.
6/ The term "West Indian" will he used to denote the English- 
speaking Caribbean: the islands and the mainland territories of
Guyana and Belize. The islands are Jamaica, Cayman, Turks & Caicos, 
Bahamas, British Virgin Islands, St. Kitts-Nevis, Anguilla, 
Montserrat, Antigua, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Grenada, 
Barbados and Trinidad-Tobago.
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The plantation produces sugar for "export" to the métropole. 
Export is really a transfer. Plantations are owned by non-residents, 
(i.e. metropolitan-based "planters"). This abstract model in Table 1 
assumes total absenteeism. According to Ragatz, by the 1830*s most 
of the plantations "were in the hands of new owners, almost none of 
whom had ever been beyond the Atlantic or had the slightest intention 
of going there". ^
Gross domestic product consists of sugar output, ground 
provision output, and gross capital formation. Slaves provide the 
labour for this output. In return they get food; their own 
provision output plus imported cured meat, fish and flour. Surplus 
generated from slave labour accrues to the metropolitan landlords.
They pay the "government" poll taxes; consume part of the surplus 
and invest the rest.
The plantation sector sells sugar to the métropole. And buys
intermediate goods from the métropole. In this model, there are
9/no resident households except the Maroons. -/ So all savings and 
investments are by non-resident households. Government invests in 
"public" works. But this infrastructure is on behalf of plantations 
only. Maroons get no public roads.
Slave economy is plantation-metropolitan economy. A nine­
teenth century British economist rightly described the West 
Indies as "a place where England finds it convenient to carry on 
the production of sugar, coffee, and a few other tropical
7/ Absenteeism was indeed quite prevalent. See Lowell Ragatz 
"Absentee Landlordism in the British Caribbean 1750-1833M Agricultural 
History, January 1931* See also Ragatz, The Fall of the Planter 
Class in the British Caribbean I 7 6 3 - I 8 6 3  (New York, I 9 6 3 ) .
8/ Ragatz, "Absentee ..." op ci t pp.7-1 3.
9 /  Maroons are the run-away slaves (Africans).
IQ/ For a more refined model of slave economy see Lloyd Best, 
Outlines of a Model of Pure Plantation Economy, Social & Economic 
Studies, September I 9 6 8 .
ll/ John Stuart Mill.
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Notation ; Cells marked X indicate transactions (i.e. payments and receipts). 
Empty cells indicate no transactions.
(7) = National Income.
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commodities." The simplified matrix of Tahle 1 illustrates this
beautifully. Transactions are plantation and metropolitan. Empty
cells predominate otherwise. And national income is equivalent to
12/the subsistence output of the Maroon sector. — '
Table 2 provides some accounting data for a St. Kitts plantation 
just before Emancipation. These data are reproduced from Douglas Hall,
1 3 /Five of the Leewards 1834-1870. — ' Salaries accrue to European
managers ("attorneys1') and European professionals (medical personnel, 
bookkeepers, etc.). These are temporary residents with a short-view 
of a West Indian sojourn. Salaries and intermediate capital goods 
(lumber and 'miscellaneous’) are the major expenses in the island.
In 1833> for example, these represented over 73$ of total expenditure 
in the island. Of the total, real island expenditure was roughly 
one half; salaries of temporary residents, the other half.
Slave provisions and medical attendance represented perhaps
less than one half of the value of expenses for the small group
14/of salaried Europeans. — ' Slave population is given as 330. And 
it is doubtful that salaried employees could exceed 10-12.
The estate seems to have sold rum and molasses in St. Kitts.
So that net expenditures in the island were about 20$ of supplies 
from the métropole. Unfortunately, the table does not provide data 
on value of sugar shipped to the métropole. But what seems clear 
from the data as they are is that intra-island transactions were 
minimal compared to transactions with the métropole. These data, 
then, give some validity to the stylized model of Table 1.
1 2/ If we recognize the maroon sector as "illegal" according 
to established "authority" then national income would be zero. 
There are no nationals. Slaves are part of the capital stock; and 
landlords live in the métropole.
1 3/ See Lloyd Best, op cit for a modified version of slave 
economy (Caribbean Universities Press, Barbados, 1971) p. 37*
14/ In the table, provisions are grouped with "fodder" for 
cattle. Thus Hall rightly locates slaves with the capital stock. 




Island accounts of Nichola Town Estate, St- Kitts
Year 1830 1831 I832 1833
£ £ £ £
Salaries 540 473 462 469
Wages _ - _ -•
Lumberj slaves, boards, shingles 
puncheons, etc. QOO 257 26I 300
Working animals _ 132 68 35
Provisions and fodder 333 279 245 148
Taxes 128 56 96 58
Miscellaneous: paint, coal, lime, etc. 140 86 94 153
Medical attendance and expenses 94 93 98 98
Total of expenses in the Island 1,463 1,376 1,324 1 ; "
to cr. ! |
_j
Miscellaneous receipts, sales of 
old cattle, etc. 75 50 43 13
Proceeds of rum and molasses 783 680 855 1,136
Total receipts in the Island 858 730 898 1,149
Net expenditure in the Island 605 646 426 112
Supplies from England 400 400 400 500
Total outstanding 1,005 1,046 826 612
Sugar shipped for sale Tons 1.98 145 185 197
Sources: Select Committee on 
Minutes of Evidence
the West India Colonies, 1848 
, Mr. Benjamin Buck Greene.
Notes: (l) The order of the columns has been changed from 
the original so as to present a clearer picture.
(2) There were no slaves bought or sold by the 
in these years. The slave population was about
estate
330.
Douglas Hall, Five of the Leewards (Barbados, 1971) p.37
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If we accept this St. Kitts estate as representative of West 
Indian plantations, then slave economy can he appropriately 
described as a "segmented economy". That is to say, it consists 
of producing units which are segmented from each other. Internal 
linkages are few, and are subordinate to linkages with the métropole.
That is the general pattern that persists to this day.
Structural dependence on metropolitan economy is the characteristic |
feature of contemporary West Indian Economy.
During the postwar period, most governments introduced incentive
legislation to promote industrialization. These programmes are
aimed to attract foreign investors, on the assumption that the
region is short of capital, entreprenurial skill and technological
know-how. Incentives provided include tax-free holidays, duty free
imports, accelerated depreciation allowances, etc. And governments
invested in "industrial estates" to provide the necessary
15/infrastructure for firms. — ' And so foreign-owned manufacturing 
activity developed to a significant degree especially in Jamaica,
Trinidad-Tohago, Guyana and Barbados.
Other developments of a similar nature occurred in mining and 
tourism. Foreign oil companies had become established in Trinidad 
from early in the 20th century. And foreign aluminium companies 
began exploiting Guyana’s bauxite as far hack as 1917* They also 
appeared on the Jamaican scene with the discovery of bauxite there 
after World War II. In Belize, the vast forest resources were 
monopolized and exploited by a British firm for decades. Finally 
the postwar period was characterized by the rapid growth of tourism.
And foreign corporations entered the tourist sector in Jamaica,
Antigua, Bahamas, Cayman, Montserrat, Barbados, Grenada and St. Lucia.
Parallel with these developments in the productive sectors of 
West Indian economy was the expansion and growth of the traditional 
foreign-owned hanking (financial) sector. From the early plantation
15/ The industrialization policies were an outgrowth of a 
classic study by W. Arthur Lewis, The Industrialization of the 
British West Indies (Puerto Rico, 1950)1
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days British and Canadian hanks had serviced the export-import trade.
These have all expanded. In addition, as the United States interest
1 ̂ /
in production grew, American hanks started to appear on the 
scene. Banks and non-hank financial intermediaries are thus 
basically foreign owned.
On the other hand, the establishment and growth of a peasantry 
created a new dynamism for economic growth and diversification.
The African (ex-slave) population set out from the beginning to 
secure an economic existence independent of the plantation. They 
secured land wherever it was available and established farms. They 
produced food for sale in the domestic markets and they introduced 
new export crops as well. Production for the home market
stimulated the development of the distribution, transporation and 
construction sectors of the economy. And it generated other internal 
linkages as well. This provided the basis for the emergence of a 
national economy.
In the struggle for economic survival, the peasantry revolted 
on occasions. And so induced political (constitutional) changes 
that led ultimately to independence in several countries in the 
i9601s. A peasant uprising in Jamaica in I865 led to the intro­
duction of Crown Colony government. And revolts throughout the 
region in the 1930* s led to the introduction of adult suffrage and 
constitutional reforms leading to increasing autonomy and, later, 
independence for some.
The war years 1939-19^5 are an important second phase in the 
transition from slave economy. Shortage of shipping affected 
exports and imports. This forced closure of the economy induced 
the development of manufactures which were previously imported. 
Production of processed foodstuffs, building materials, shoes,
16/ Chiefly mining, tourism and manufacturing.
I?/ See W.K. Marshall, Notes on Peasant Development in the 
West Indies, Social and Economic Studies, September I968 for an 
exposition of the growth of the peasantry.
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matches, etc. led to import-substitution on a scale significant 
enough to convince West Indians that they too could industrialize.
And this set the stage for the official industrialization policies 
introduced after the hostilities were over.
Transition from Slave Economy
One hundred and forty years after the abolition of slavery, w
West Indian economy displays certain basic structural features of 
slave economy, Tbis will become clear in later discussion. Before 
tbat, a brief exposition of the evolution of the economy since 
Emancipation.
After 1838, there are two broad trends of economic change 
dominating the West Indian scene for the next 100 years. One is 
the establishment and growth of a peasantry by the ex-slaves and 
their descendants. The other is the reorganization and consolida­
tion of the traditional plantation.
Over the period, the plantation sector was subject to numerous 
shocks. Emancipation raised the cost of labour immediately. Then 
in the 1840's the introduction of free trade exposed West Indian 
sugar to competition from other lower cost producers. Then the 
opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 brought further competition from 
tropical Asia. And beet sugar production was gaining an ascendancy 
in Europe. Additionally, technological changes in sugar production 
increased the capital requirements of plantations. In the process, 
individual proprietary planters and smaller plantations fell victims 
to the corporate firms and the larger plantations which expanded 
acreage at the expense of the smaller estates. Capital became 
increasingly concentrated and the number of plantations declined 
dramatically.
During the 1930's British refining interests began producing 
sugar cane and raw sugar in the West Indies. These multinational 
corporations have since come to dominate production in most of the 
territories. And so the traditional plantation sector has remained 
foreign owned, as it was during the slave era. The output contributes 
to the domestic product. But only wages and taxes accrue to nationals.
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On the other hand, the establishment and growth of a peasantry 
created a new dynamism for economic growth and diversification.
Contemporary West Indian Economy
The character of the foreign-owned economic activities in 
mining, tourism, manufacturing and hanking is similar in many 
respects to that of the slave plantation. They are West Indian 
extensions of metropolitan economy. Linkages are predominantly 
external, with the métropole. Contributions to the domestic product 
are high hut income accruing to nationals is not as great.
Technology is imported. Raw materials are exported in crude (or 
semi-processed) form. Shipping is controlled by metropolitan firms.
And, of course, profits accrue to metropolitan residents.
Furthermore, these enterprises rely heavily on expatriate 
managerial personnel. These white people occupy privileged 
positions in much the same way that the planters did under
plantation slavery. And the foreign corporations wield considerable 
political power. Their financial strength is used to manipulate the 
political process in their own interest.
The structure of contemporary West Indian economy can be better 
described and understood if we group the foreign-owned sectors 
together and the nationally-owned ones into two separate components.
This is done in Table 3 which shows inter-sectoral linkages, with 
foreign-owned sectors designated as "overseas” and nationally-owned 
ones as "residentiary”. This model matrix can he adjusted to
suit individual West Indian economies. For example, mining may be 
absent in some countries and tourism absent (or insignificant) in 
others.
Table 3 suggests that there are few linkages between the over­
seas and residentiary components of the economy. That large trans­
actions are concentrated in the overseas component and relatively
18/ The terminology is borrowed from L. Best and K. Levitt, 
Export-Propelled Industrialization in the Caribbean (mimeo, unpublished).
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small transactions with the residentiary componente The predominance 
of empty cells and 0's in the upper right and lover left quadrants; 
the clusters of X ’s in the upper left, and of S's in the lover right 
quadrants are to he noted in this connection.
The major payments hy overseas sectors to residentiary sectors 
are to construction, government (taxes), and households (vages). 
Payments to construction are on the whole lumpy. These are mainly 
in the initial phase of industrial production and for hotel con­
struction. In overseas sectors such as mining and manufacturing, the 
capital intensive nature of technology creates a limited number of 
johs. Consequently, payments to households are relatively small.
And in manufacturing and tourism payments to government are relatively 
small because of the tax holidays given as incentives to foreign 
investors.
The overall picture, then, is a lop-sided economy. The hulk of 
the economy's resources are concentrated in the overseas component 
while the hulk of the population are engaged in minor transactions 
within the residentiary component. So far as economic development 
is concerned, the linkage potential lies within the residentiary 
component. But resources there are restricted.
Some empirical support for the generalization of Table 3 is 
provided hy the data in Table 4. That table summarizes inter­
industry relations in the Trinidad-Tobago economy in I962.
First, the dominance of oil in terms of total output is to he noted. 
Oil accounted for about bh% of total output. By comparison other 
major sector shares were 'Distribution* 11%, 'Other Manufacturing*
9ft>, with 'Construction* and ’Services' about (>% each. Commenting 
on the Table, Francis observes that for oil;
Intermediate input as a whole is relatively low, only 
.2441. The highest cost coefficient, .2080, represents 
purchases from 'Oil* itself. All other cost coefficients 
are very small ..... Primary input is quite high,
19/ Reproduced from A.A. Francis, A Note on Inter-Industry 
Relations in the Economy of Trinidad and Tobago, I962,
C.S.O. Research Papers, No. 2 December I963, pp 6O-6I.
Table 3* —  A Model Transactions Matrix for Caribbean Economy
O V E R S E A S  R E S I D E N T I A R Y
Notations Cells marked X indicate relatively large transactions (i.e. payments and receipts).
Cells marked S indicate relatively small transactions.
Cells marked 0 indicate minor (insignificant) transactions.
Empty cells indicate no transactions.
Table 4 ; Input Structures
Alcoholic Food Other Trans­ Distri­
Oil Beverages Manu­ Manu­ portation bution Services
and factur­ factur­
Tobacco ing ing
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I
9
.2080 .0048 .0139 .0324 .1312 .OO54 .0172
¿L
3 _ - .0199 - — .0027
4 .0049 .0724 .0787 .0214 ,1103 .0306 .0696
5 .0081 - .0071 .0064 - .0323 .0281
6 .0155 .0139 .0259 .0566 .0040 - .0026
7 .0036 .0281 .0199 .0168 .0632 .0317 .0208
8 .0005 - .0193 .0062 « .0101 .0188
9 ,0032 .0061 .OO63 .0113 .0046 .0434 .OO74
10 - .OI63 .0302 - - .0008 -
ii - - ». «. _
12 - .0163 .1368 .0442 - .0014
13 .0002 - - .0081 - .0209 .0327
Sub-total .2441 .1578 .3581 .2035 .3132 .1780 .1986
Imports .3930 .2522 .1914 .2227 .0250 .0838 .1173
Wages & Salaries .0686 .1681 .1195 .1276 .2627 .2127 .2146
Government .0664 .3114 .0236 .0663 .0532 .0348 .0556
Depreciation .0965 .0287 .0209 .0328 .1159 .0111 .0387
Surplus .1314 .0818 .2865 .3470 .2300 .4796 .3753
Sub-total .7559 .8422 .6419 .7965 .6868 .8220 .8014
Total 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
Total Output (|mn.) 800 25 50 I62 63 199 107

























1 .0402 .0406 .0059 - .0046 ~
¿
3 « » * .0026
4 .1704 .0097 .0142 .0714 .0454 .0018
5 .0297 .0168 .0185 .0298 .0072 -
6 .O69I .0031 .0185 .0304 .0367 _
7 - .0276 .0110 .0058 .0033 .0188
8 - .0014 e “ - _ ,0976
9 .0009 .0388 .0104 .0087 .0039 .0017
10 - - - - .0013 _
11 - - .5079 - - -
12 .0039 - - - .0013 -
13 - _ _ .0084 .0318
Sub-total .3142 • 1379 .5864 .1545 .10t>3 .1517
Imports .1756 .2942 .0666 .0234 .0498 .0223
Wages and Salaries . 2984 .4927 .1372 .3998 .2393 .1246
Government .0331 -.0205 .0356 .0433 .0138 .0902
Depreciation .0192 .0733 .0799 .0283 .0221 .0036
Surplus .1595 .0223 .0943 .3507 .5688 .6076
Sub-total .6858 .8621 .4136 .8455 .8937 .8483
Total 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
Total Output ($mn.) 114 62 46 24 78 79
Source: A. A. Francis, Inter-Industry Relations in the Econony of Trinidad and
Tobago, I962. C.S.O. Research Papers (I965)• '
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approximately .7559• In particular the primary cost 
coefficient for imports is very high, being slightly over 
50$ of primary input as a whole. The second highest cost 
coefficient is "Surplus’, .1314. This figure is almost 
twice as high as the fourth ranking primary cost 
coefficient for ’Wages and Salaries*. 20/
Dependence on imports, self-reliance for inputs, relatively large 
profits, and relatively low wage disbursements are the characteristic 
features of such foreign-owned sectors.
On the distribution side of the oil sector's operations we find 
that for intermediate demand, "the highest distribution coefficient 
represents sales of 'Oil* to itself. The second ranking coefficient 
represents sales to ’Transport' .<=. The remaining coefficients are 
rather small." Final demand is relatively high, the highest 
coefficient representing 'Exports* while remaining coefficients are 
very low.
On the whole, West Indian economies can best be described as 
dependent. These economies depend heavily on external trade, 
finance, technology and management. In terms of their internal
functioning there is a characteristic gap between the structure of
92/domestic demand and domestic resource use. =~J This dependence has 
significant repercussions on the functioning of the economy and on 
the polity. (These matters are considered in the next chapter).
Although all the economies are characterized by dependence, the 
degrees of dependence vary according to the nature of the dominant 
sector. Accordingly, for some purposes of analysis, it might be 
useful to utilize a typology of these economies. Some dominant 
activities are more labour intensive than others. And we would 
expect different patterns of political and social behaviour as 
between plantation workers, peasants, mine workers and urban workers-
20/ Ibid, p. 59.
21/ Ibid, p. 64.
22/ See Havelock Brewster, Economic Dependences A Quantitative 
Interpretation, Social & Economic Studies, March 1973»
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Furthermore, the nature of economic change varies as between 
commodities, in accordance with differential rates of growth of 
demand.
For present purposes, then, we introduce the following typology 
as a basis for* looking at economic change and its consequences in 
the next chapter:
PURE MINERAL EXPORT ............... Trinidad-Tobago




PURE PLANTATION ............... St. Kitts, Belize




MIXED ECONOMIES ............... Jamaica
Guyana
Barbados
In Jamaica, the mixture is mineral, tourism, plantation and peasant. 
In Guyana it is mineral and plantation. And in Barbados, plantation 
and tourism.
Economic typologies may prove useful in explaining social change 
among a group of countries. For example, we would expect different 
types of social formations in predominantly peasant societies (like 
Dominica) as compared with urban-industrial societies like Trinidad. 
And the overall rates of growth of the economies will vary with the 
comparative rates of growth of the dominant economic activity. For 
example, during the post-war period, the overall rate of economic 
growth has been greatest in those economies dominated by minerals 
and tourism than in those dominated by agriculture.
But rates of economic growth obscure differences in patterns 
of income distribution associated with different economic types.
For example, income is likely to he more equitably distributed in 
pure tourist economies than in pure mineral economies since employ­
ment creation is greater in tourism than in mineral exploitation. 
Again the more diversified the economic base, the more diffused would
be income opportunities. The following tabulation is suggestive of
this hypothesis. It shows the percentage distribution of incomes












81 - 87 13 -  19
In the "pure mineral" economy of Trinidad-Tobago the share of 
labour is much less than in the "mixed" economies of Jamaica and 
Guyana. And that of the mixed Caribbean economies far below labour's 
share in the more diversified developed countries. The pure mineral 
economy generates much more profits relative to labour because of the 
characteristic highly capital-intensive nature of production. Whereas 
in Jamaica the less capital-intensive activities in tourism, 
plantation and peasant agriculture, and manufacturing counterbalance 
bauxite's tendency to keep down labour's share. And in Guyana 
plantation sugar and rice have much the same effect.
The differences between economic types have non-economic 
consequences as well. The structure of the labour force in terms of 
occupational distribution, sex and age composition, etc., is likely 
to vary across the types identified. For example a higher proportion 
of women would likely occur in pure tourist economies than in pure 
mineral ones. And characteristics of the labour force in turn 
affect social classes and political organization.
In later chapters, an attempt will be made to explore some of 
these differences after consideration of sociological and political 
typologies have been presented and considered.
23/ These data relate to business as represented by corporate 
firms. The data are biased by the fact that not all unincorporated 
firms are family enterprises so that labour is not equal to business 
in those cases.
C H A P T E R  III
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ECONOMIC CHANGE AND CONSEQUENCE
The profile of West Indian economies has been adjusted by 
developments in recent decades. New sectors have emerged and 
traditional ones have either declined in relative importance or 
have disappeared altogether (sugar in St. Lucia and. St. Vincent are 
examples of the latter). Notwithstanding changing profiles, the 
structural properties remain basically unaltered. The economies 
have failed so far to develop an internal dynamic for development. 
External dependence has deepened everywhere and, with that, a 
certain pattern of backwardness has been promoted.
The general pattern is one where foreign capital management 
and technology are combined with particular resource sectors to 
generate incomes for only a small share of the labour force and 
sometimes revenue for the public sector. The hulk of the population 
become increasingly alienated from the resources of the region. And 
their ever increasing impoverishment leads to social changes of 
profound significance.
The present chapter provides a description of the nature of 
economic change in various sectors and an analysis of some of the 
social structural consequences of those changes.
I AGRICULTURE
The dichotomy between plantations and peasants (small farmers) 
remains firmly entrenched everywhere. No attempts have been made 
to introduce programmes of land reform.
The general pattern of change shows the following main trends : 
increasing control of farm land by plantations at the expense of 
small farmers, concentration of plantation land among fewer owners; 
increasing capitalization of plantations; improvements in 
production techniques by plantations; fragmentation of land in the 
small farm sectors; insignificant changes in techniques of 
production in that sector; often a reduction in the number of
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small farmers and a decline in the land farmed by them. ^
Essentially, the position of the peasantry at any point in 
time is directly dependent on the plantation sector. In addition, 
plantations have direct control over the lives of rural wage 
workers. Changes within the agricultural sector need therefore to 
he analysed in terms of the interaction between these three basic 
groups. Peasants are in direct competition for land with 
plantations hut many o f  them work on plantations part-time and are 
thus in competition for wage work with the rural proletariat. The 
latter have few alternative economic opportunities —  government 
rural public works schemes offer some wage opportunities; hut 
political party patronage is the decisive factor on who gets a 
share of that cake.
Plantations then must be seen as being the chief institutions 
affecting the relative fortunes of both peasants and rural 
proletariat. As the plantations increase in economic importance, 
this influence becomes more marked. Expanding size, increasing 
capitalization and the modernization of technology have adverse 
effects on the other two rural groups. Less land becomes available 
to the peasantry and less labour opportunities become available 
to the rural proletariat and some peasants. The process results in 
increasing alienation of two groups which are already on the margins 
of society. But the degree of alienation varies as between the two 
groups.
For purposes of analysis it is useful to make a distinction 
between the 'margin of subsistence' and 'the margin of survival'.
The margin of subsistence represents levels of living (consumption) 
which are barely tolerable by civilized human standards but which
l/ In the main sugar producing territories, foreign corporations 
are dominant plantation owners. Tate & Lyle, the giant British sugar 
refining enterprise produces 100$ of sugar output in Belize, 92$ of 
that in Trinidad, and 6()$ of that in Jamaica. And in Guyana, another 
British corporation —  Booker McConnell Ltd —  produces 98$ of 
national output. Together, these two enterprises account for over 
90$ of total West Indian sugar production.
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are achieved by the individual with the resources at his command.
The margin of survival represents levels which are intolerable -
i.e. the individual must rely on the goodwill of others or scuffle
9/in order to survive. -y
For the West Indies as a whole, the ’small* peasant is on the 
margin of subsistence. (Middle and big peasants who have sufficient 
land resources to be able to hire wage labour and/or to secure 
machine capital generally achieve decent levels of living. But 
these are a minority of the peasantry.) The rural proletariat are, 
for the most part, on the margin of survival. Over time, the 
position of the peasantry shifts with changes in the fortunes of 
the plantation sector. During periods of plantation expansion the 
peasantry is forced back closer to the margin of survival. The 
opposite shift takes place during periods of plantation contraction. 
The position of the rural proletariat remains static over time —  
on or about the margin of survival.
The General Pattern of Change
Tables 1 and 2 provide a summary of census and survey data 
showing the position of the peasantry in relation to land, and 
relative to plantations. The small peasant is assumed to correspond 
to the size group less than 5 acres; the plantation falls in the 
size group over 500 acres. (Exceptions to this general rule of 
thumb should he made for places like Barbados where a farm of over 
100 acres is a plantation. But no effort is being made for that 
kind of refinement in the present exercise.) Table 2 shows the 
size group distribution of all farms, by territory.
Comparing the data in these two tables reveals the dismal 
position of the peasantry. Everywhere the small peasant (less 
than 5 acres) dominate in number hut they have only a small
2/ The distinction between subsistence and survival is 
critical. In the West Indies many people happen to survive because 
of a high propensity to share by those who can afford to subsidize 
others. This propensity operates at the level of family and 
friends as well as on a broader social scale.
Table 1: Proportion of Total Number of Farms by Size Group and Territory
Percent
Year Territory SIZE GROUP (Acres)
< 5 5 - < 5 5 25  - < 1 0 Q 1 0 0  -  < 5 0 0 5 0 0 + Total
. Belize n.a. XI » cl • XX • 9, * n.a. n.a. n.a.
1 9 6 1 Barbados 9 8 . 3 . 8 . 2 . 5 . 2 1 0 0
I 9 6 I British Virgin Islands 3 6 . 6 5 2 . 7 9 . 5 1 . 3 Q 1 0 0
- Guyana n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
19 6 8 Jamaica
Leeward Islands
7 8 . 6 I 9 . 4 1 . 6 . 4 A * « 1 0 0
I 9 6 I Ant i gua/Barbuda 9 1 . 1 7 - 7 . 3 9 «4 . 26 1 0 0
I 9 6 I Montserrat 9 2 . 7 6 5 , ' 1 0 0
I 9 6 I St. Kitts/Nevis/Anguilla 9 4 . 5 3 . 9 . 7 . 5 . 4 5 1 0 0
1 9 6 3 Trinidad & Tobago* 
Windward Islands
4 6 . 5 4 6 . 8 5 . 3 1 . 1 • J 1 0 0
I 9 6 I Grenada 8 9 - 7 8 . 8 .9 .5 .1 1 0 0
I 9 6 I Dominica 7 5 . 2 2 1 . 5 2 . 3 . 8 *7 • J 1 0 0
I96I St. Lucia 8 2 . 5 1 4 . 9 1.9 • 6 . 2 1 0 0
I96I St. Vincent 89.0 1 0 . 1 .6 p .1 10 0
*Provisional estimates for holdings of 1 acre and over (excluding land owned by Government)»




<5 5 - < 25 25 - <Í0Q 100 - <000 500+ Total
Belize n. a. I  i *  c i  -j n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
I96I Barbados I3.4 2.4 2.5 50.4 3I .3 100
I96I British Virgin Islands 5.7 43.7 34.2 16.4 - 100
_ Guyana n. a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1968 Jamaica
Leeward Islands
14.9 22.1 8.3 9.9 44.9 100
I96I Antigua/b arbuda 26.7 9.7 4.4 I7 .I 42.2 100
Montserrat n. a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
I96I St. Kitts/Nevis/Anguilla I5 .O 5.2 4.3 18.9 56.6 100
1963 Trinidad & Tobago* 
Windward Islands
6.9 3O .7 I5.I 16.2 3I.I 100
I96I Grenada 23.9 I9 .7 IO.3 3I.I I5 .O 100
I96I Dominica I3 .2 21.0 12.2 2I.3 32 .2 100
I96I St. Lucia 18.0 I9.6 1.2 I7 .9 33.8 100
I96I St. Vincent 2 7.O 24.5 7.69 I6.O 24.2 100
*Provisional Estimates for holdings of 1 acre and over (excluding land owned by Government).
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proportion of the farm land. On the other hand, plantations (over 
500 acres) are few in number hut they have a large proportion of 
farm land. Barbados is perhaps the extreme case. There, small 
peasants are 98 per cent of all farmers and they exist on 13 per 
cent of all farm land; while the plantations (over 100 acres) are 
less than one per cent of all farmers with 82 per cent of all farm 
land. These tables clearly reveal the existing land alienation of 
the peasantry throughout the region.
It was suggested earlier that alienation of the peasantry has 
been increasing as a result of the incursion of monopoly capital. 
Table 3 provides some evidence of this for Jamaica. There we see 
that the number of small peasants and the acreage farmed by them 
increased between 1943 and I96I; hut average farm size remained 
virtually unchanged. Over the same period, the number of plantations 
declined drastically; acreage farmed also declined hut not to the 
same degree; so that average farm size increased appreciably. It 
is important to note that the total area in farms declined, at 
about one-half the rate of decline in plantation land.
Now these trends tell a story. Non-agrarian capitalism (mining 
and tourism) came on the scene in Jamaica during the period covered 
by the data. As well, the revolt of 1938 (to he discussed later) 
resulted in intensified government policy to provide land for the 
peasantry —  through "land settlement" schemes. Additionally the 
population of Jamaica increased from I.3 million in 1943 to the 
present two millions.
The decline in total farm land shown in Table 3 is chiefly a 
result of mining developments. Metropolitan (U.S.A. and Canada) 
bauxite companies purchased considerable areas of land. And a good 
share of this was former plantation land —  particularly in St. Ann, 
traditionally a plantation ("pen-keeper'—  i.e. livestock ranch) 
parish. Nevertheless, the average size of plantation increased as 
the remaining plantation land became more concentrated among fewer 
plantations. The marked increase in small-peasant acreage between 
1943 and 1968 is directly attributable to the government land settle­
ment scheme. Government purchased several derelict plantations and
île 3 î Peasant and Plantation Land and Labour, -Jamaica, 1943-1968
1961 1968
ns Total SmallPeasants Plantations Total
Small
Peasants Plantations Total
2 149,142 113,239 350 158,938 149,703 295 190,582
0 1,836,668 201,093 774,000 1,706,561 223,818 676,426 1,508,000
3 - 1 .8 2,210 - 1.5 2,340 -
7 44 84 17 42
peasants’ refer to farm size group of less than 5 acres, 
ize group of more than 500 acres » The ’total’ columns refer 
es size groups not shown in Table (i.e. farms of 5 - 500 acres).
sub-divided them for sale to peasants. The decline in plantation 
acreage, then, is partly a result of the invasion of non-agrarian 
capitalism, and partly a result of peasant substitution.
Although peasant acreage increased, the average size of
peasant holdings remained static. In short the rate of growth of
peasant farmers kept pace with, the rate of growth of land operated
hy them. This is a crude indication that the economic position of
3/the peasantry has remained virtually unchanged since 19^3* If 
we assume that average household size of small peasants is five, 
then in I968, the 150,000 small farms provided subsistence for 
750,000 people on 15 per cent of Jamaica's farm land. While 350 
plantation owners luxuriated on 45 per cent of all farm land.
Back in 1943? 530 plantation owners earned profits from 60 per 
cent of all farm land. As well, they benefited from capital gains 
on land values since that time. Census data reveal that productivity 
of plantation farm land tripled between 1943 and I96I. It is clear 
then that the economic position of plantation owners has improved 
appreciably, in both absolute and relative terms.
To return to the general West Indian situation, and the special 
case of the sugar plantation, we find an interesting interplay between 
plantations and some of the peasantry —  i.e. those engaged in cane 
farming. In that game, plantations win again; peasants lose.
During the plantation labour crisis following Emancipation, and 
after numerous efforts to solve that crisis, plantation owners finally 
resolved to encourage peasant production of cane to provide the 
necessary throughput for their factories. This is the genesis of 
peasant cane farming in the West Indies. It began toward the end 
of the 19th century and today cane farmers (many of whom are peasants) 
produce one-half of sugar cane output in Jamaica and significant
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3/ This inference is reasonable unless it can he demonstrated 
that land productivity on small farms improved substantially and 
that the terms of trade have shifted in favour of the peasant. 
Census data indicate a decline in land productivity. In any case 
it is clear that the position of the peasantry relative to the 
plantation has worsened over the period.
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shares of output in Trinidad and Belize, (ironically, the Guyana 
government is now encouraging peasant cane farming which never 
existed there before.)
Howard Johnson bas analysed the origins of cane farming in
Trinidad. He demonstrates the importance of the planter class to
its development. Planters around the turn of the 20th century often
provided land, as well as advancing capital and sometimes even
supplied labour, to the cane farmers. Their encouragement of cane
farming is explained by the fact that they anticipated certain
benefits from its establishment ... Low prices emphasized the need
for more economical sugar production. However the savings effected
4/were mainly m  the manufacturing process. —1 Cane Farming involves 
more risk than processing. Furthermore, since factory owners are 
in a monopsonistic position they can determine the price paid to 
farmers growing cane. From the beginning, until now, the price was 
set at a disadvantage to cane farmers. Johnson concludes that "the 
cane farmer was plagued with three major problems —  lack of capital, 
inadequate transport facilities and an unsatisfactory cane-price 
formula. These difficulties have persisted up to the present" (p.7 3 ) • 
The cane farmer is, in essence, a plantation worker who works for 
the plantation on his own land. His fortunes are hound up directly 
with those of the plantation.
The rural proletariat suffers a greater degree of alienation 
than the peasantry. Plantation strategy since Emancipation is to 
create a labour surplus in each economy. This was engineered by 
importing labour (under indenture) and by land monopoly. A more 
recent strategy is mechanization —  the substitution of capital for 
labour as the labour force became unionized subsequent to the 
revolts of the 1930's. According to Table 3? plantations in Jamaica 
maintained the same rate of employment per 100 acres of cultivated 
acreage; the number of workers employed increased from about 27,000
hj Howard Johnson 1 The Origins and Early Development of Cane 
Farming in Trinidad, 1882 - 1906’, The Journal of Caribbean History,
5 (1972), 59.
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in I943 to about 32,000 m  I96I, —  nearly 20 per cent. Meanwhile
output per man working on plantations rose about 64 per cent over the 
same period. The real wage of plantation workers has remained 
virtually static.
In Jamaica, cultivated acreage on plantations actually increased 
during this period (from I60,000 acres to 191*000 acres). It will 
be recalled that total plantation farm land decreased. Improvements 
in technology —  both mechanical (labour saving) and biological- 
chemical (land saving) explain the sharp rise in productivity, per 
man and per acre. But the plantation worker has gained nothing from 
these improvements.
It is important to note that most of these improvements resulted 
from public sector investments, and that the industry is subsidized 
by governments throughout the region. The technological improvements 
have served to aggravate the unemployment situation. Machine capital 
displaces labour directly. So too does chemical technology which 
replaces workers with weedicides.
Vest Indian economies are all labour-surplus economies.
Carmen McFarlane provides the following estimates for i960 of open 





















In such situations monopsonistic buyers of labour services, as 
plantations are in specific localities, do not need to pay wages 
higher than survival levels. The more so where plantations and other
5/ Carmen McFarlanef The Employment Situation in Overpopulated 
Territories in the Commonwealth Caribbean, Human Resources in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean (ed Jack Harewood, St. Augustine, Trinidad,
I97O).
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capitalist monopolize land (thus restricting labour from own -
account production) and where there are limited job opportunities 
available elsewhere.
The rural proletariat earns income working on the plantation, 
on the wharves shipping plantation products, and in other 
plantation related activities; they work as well with middle and 
big peasants, with other small capitalist, and with government and 
the petty bourgeoisie (service activity). The plantation worker 
suffers the most. Income is seasonal; and out-of-crop the worker 
lives off credit in order to survive. Crop-time work pays hack 
this credit in good years; and it may not during had years. The 
margin of survival is most pronounced among this category of worker. 
But all rural workers are pushed on to the margin of survival when 
there is depression in the plantation sector. For it is in that 
sector that economic action begins to multiply and to decelerate.
Many small peasants are wage workers on plantations. They suffer 
as both peasant and proletariat.
I! MINERALS, MANUFACTUBING AM) TOURISM
Traditionally foreign investment was the basis for mineral 
exploitation in the region —  oil in Trinidad from early in the 
century and bauxite in Guyana beginning about 1917  • This pattern 
extended into the postwar period with the development of new 
activities, mining (bauxite in Jamaica); branch-plant manufacturing 
(chiefly Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad-Tobago, and Guyana; and tourism 
in Cayman, Bahamas, Antigua, Montserrat, Virgin Islands and Barbados). 
The tremendous growth of foreign investment in these new activities 
deepened the dependent nature of West Indian economies.
Mineral Exploitation
The characteristic feature of mineral exploitation is that it 
is highly capital-intensive; thereby creating few jobs and large 
profits. Furthermore it is usually land extensive as rival 
companies seek to control as much of the resource as possible in 
order to maintain and improve their competitive position in the
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international industry. Mineral firms are part of multinational 
corporate enterprises with which they develop linkages; accordingly 
few linkages are made within the economy where minerals are being 
exploited.
The chief contribution to these economies are by way of pay­
ments of taxes to government, wages to the small group of workers 
employed, and substantial payments for construction during capacity 
expansion. Accordingly, changes of significance occur when 
governments increase revenues by direct participation and/or 
increased taxation., When the industry is expanding capacity; and 
when changes in production technology affect the number of workers 
employed. Examples of these types of change occurred in different 
parts of the region in recent decades.
In the area of government intervention, the most significant
6/event was th e nationalizati on of DEMBA hy the Guyana government 
in 1971» The act of taking over ownership and control of the 
larger bauxite producer placed at the disposal of the Guyana public 
sector all the surplus which previously accrued to the foreign 
owners. Government is therefore able to utilize this surplus for 
national development. In this connection, plans have been announced 
for achieving the objective of providing basic necessities for all 
Guyanese people hy 1980. The basic structure of the industry other­
wise has remained unchanged. A managerial elite, high wage work 
force, and segregated housing and recreational patterns continue.
But on the basis of occupational status, instead of race and colour, 
as under previous foreign ownership. Efforts are being made to 
integrate bauxite more with other sectors of the economy. For 
example, the use of local starches as flocculents is being actively 
considered; that would provide linkages with agriculture.
6/ Demerara Bauxite Company was a subsidiary of ALCAN prior 
to nationalization. It i s  now' GUYBAU (The Guyana Bauxite Corporation). 
At time of writing Government announced nationalization of the other 
bauxite company - Reynolds.
Another act of government participation occurred in Trinidad 
where that government purchased shares in the oil industry.
Increased taxation measures were also introduced recently (1974) in 
Jamaica on all bauxite-alumina producers there and in Guyana on 
Reynolds Limited (the other bauxite producer), These tax increases 
have been substantial. They provide governments with increased 
revenues and widen the financial scope for transforming these economies.
Capacity expansion has been most marked in the Jamaica bauxite 
industry which began around 1950 and mushroomed that country to the 
world's leading exporter of bauxite by the late 1960fs. Capacity 
expansion creates jobs in construction, transportation, and involves 
substantial local purchases. But this is a jerky process which 
creates temporary effects. In Jamaica the "main" phase of investment
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were as follows:
(i) 1950-1953; establishment of initial capacity 
by Kaiser, Reynolds and Alcan
(Ü) 1954-1955; lull
(iii) 1956-1958: expansion of capacity of Kaiser, 
Reynolds and Alcan
(iv) 1959-1962: lull
(v) 1963 : completion of capacity by Alcoa
(vi) 1964-1965: lull
(vii) 1966-1969*. expansion of capacity by Kaiser,
Reynolds and Alcan and establish­
ment of Alpart alumina plant. 7/
One of the problems posed by such jerky patterns of capacity 
expansion is that on completion of these projects, "large-scale
unemployment of skilled workers and spare capacity in the building
8/industry usually result." -/ On one project, for example, 5»000 
workers were employed at the height of construction of a plant 
which would use a permanent work force of about 1,000.
1 ¡  Norman Girvan Foreign Capital and Economic Underdeve1opment 
in Jamaica (Kingston, Jamaica," 1972) pp 51-52. “
8/ Ibid, p.52.
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There is a major adverse aspect of the growth of bauxite- 
alumina production in Jamaica which must he considered along with 
the discussion of capacity expansion. That is the large-scale land 
alienation associated with the process. Companies were allowed to 
secure freehold ownership of land. And in the scramble to control 
resources, land speculation arid the loss of control of vast acreages 
resulted. The adverse effects on agriculture and on domestic food
9/supplies have been severely marked. ■¡-/
Changing production technology has been most dramatic in the 
Trinidad petroleum industry. Modernization of the industry involved 
more capital intensive techniques of production and retrenchment of 
workers occurs from year to year in recent times.
Manufac tur ing
Official policy in the West Indies during the postwar period 
has been to encourage industrialization by providing incentives 
which would attract foreign investors to come and establish 
manufacturing plants. These incentives involved tax-free holidays, 
duty free imports of raw materials, accelerated depreciation 
allowances, etc. Two types of manufacturing industries were aimed 
at: import--substitution, and export-promotion. These programmes
have provided the major basis for expansion of manufacturing in 
Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad-Tobago, and Guyana.
Although a substantial number of industries have been attracted, 
their overall impact on income and employment creation has not been 
substantial. According to Jefferson;
2/ See di scussion in preceding chapter.
10/ R.D. Thomas, The Adjustment of Displaced Workers in a Labour 
Surplus Economy (Kingston 1973).
.11/ Owen C. Jefferson, External Dependence and Economic Develop­
ment •—  A Commonwealth Caribbean Perspective (U.W.I. Dept, of Economics, 
mimeo, 1972) pp. 6-7»
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Imports of raw materials, fuels, intermediate and
capital goods, together with repatriation of 
profits etc. add up to a substantial proportion of 
the import-substitution sectors ... It has been 
estimated that only about 25 per cent of the output 
of firms producing under incentives in the manufactur­
ing sector accrues as national income to the Jamaican 
economy. Furthermore, only about 13,000 direct jobs 
were created by these industries over a 12 year period 
in a situation where the labour force is growing by at 
least 20,000 annually. The situation in. Trinidad is 
not markedly different.
And the expert-promotion industries did not perform much better 
because of problems of marketing finished goods in the markets of 
industrial countries «
Undoubtedly, the industrialization programme has attracted 
several manufacturing firms to establish plants. And in the process
urban employment has been created, leading to the emergence of a new 
factory class involving chiefly women in areas like textiles, 
cigarettes, etc. The question still remains as to whether the 
benefits of the programme outweigh the costs. For example, 
governments subsidy has been heavy —  investment in. infrastructure 
and revenues foregone (both income and import duties).
Tourism
The growth of the tourist industry was also stimulated hy 
government incentives. Foreign investment has virtually transformed 
certain island economies where previously tourism was non-existent 
into pure tourist economies within the past decade or so. Cayman 
and Montserrat are two cases in point. Where an industry existed 
before, as in Bahamas, Jamaica, Antigua and Barbados, capacity 
expansion has been rapid over the past two decades. It has been
estimated that tourism now generates 66$ of national income in
11a/'Bahamas, 13$ in Barbados and 6% in Jamaica. —
lia/ Û.C, Jefferson, Ibid p.9»
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The tourist industry, like mining and branch-plant manufacturing,
characteristically has few linkages with the rest of the economy.
The import content varies between 40 and 60 per cent; and profits 
are leaked from the economy to foreign investors, however, tourism 
generates substantial employment relative to other forms of foreign 
investment. The seasonal nature of employment bears features of the 
sugar plantation.
Expansion of capacity generates considerable employment during
con.struct!on of new hotels. But, as in mineral exploitation, the
pattern is jerky and presents adjustment problems for the building
industry and skilled labour in that sector. The chief problem
arising from capacity expansion i s  land alienation and land
speculation. In the process, tourism retards the chances for
agricultural development. Especially in the smaller islands
"acreages formerly or presently under cultivation appear to he
passing into foreign hands for development as retiree housing
12/estates and recreational facilities such as golf courses.” — '
In addition to competition with agriculture for land, tourism 
also "intensifies the existing bias against agricultural production 
by contributing both to the raising of the reserve price of labour 
and the inflation of land prices in some areas".
Other problems associated with the growth of tourism of the 
type promoted in the Vest Indies are the dependence on a narrow 
market and the demonstration effect on local tastes. North America 
(USA and Canada) accounts for 80 per cent or more of tourist 
arrivals. Depressions in that region are transmitted immediately 
and lead to unemployment and spare capacity in the industry. The 
luxury-type tourist industry generates a demonstration effect on 
residents who are thereby influenced in their consumption 
expectations towards imported luxuries in economies that can ill 
afford them.
12/ Beverly Watson, Supplementary Notes on Foreign Investment 
in the Commonwealth Caribbean (i. SER Working Paper No. 1, U.W.I., 
Kingston 1974) p.5~~
15/ 0.C . Jef fer-son, op cit, p. 10.
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H I  CONSEQUENCES OF CHANGE —  AN OVERVIEW
The general changes in different economic sectors discussed 
above have profound effects on different groups of population, on 
the social structure, on the economy as a whole, and on the politics 
of change. Some of these effects are described in this section hut 
more detailed discussion must await exploration of the non-economic 
parameters of change in the next few chapters-
Perhaps the greatest pressure has been felt by the peasantry. 
Pressure from plantations, from mining, and from tourism —  all 
competing with the poor peasant for the limited land hase of the 
island economies. Naturally, the peasant fared worst in this 
competition. His position is further aggravated by increasing 
population. The general trend has been one of increasing peasant 
population, via natural increase, on a declining land base.
Peasants managed to maintain an equilibrium over the period 
only where competition was not intense and where new income 
opportunities arose. Some of the Windward Islands are cases in 
point. There, with no mining anywhere and little tourism in Dominica 
and St. Vincent, with the demise of the sugar plantations in St. Lucia, 
St. Vincent and Grenada, and with bananas emerging as a new cash 
crop, the peasantry managed to consolidate itself. Thus the Windwards 
remain predominantly peasant economies.
The relative decline of the peasantry in the region as a whole 
has had far-reaching effects. Peasants are the main source of 
domestic food supplies. And the relatively slow growth of food 
output associated with the demise of the peasantry has contributed 
to increased food imports and rising food prices throughout the region. 
The problem has been further aggravated in recent years with the 
world shortage of food and animal feeds. Food prices throughout 
have risen faster than any other set of prices in consumer price 
indices. The resulting inflationary situation has had serious 
repercussions, both social and economic. On the whole, the real 
income of working class people remained static or declined. Food 
shortages were so acute in some countries recently that systems of
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rationing, boarding and black markets developed. — '
Food shortages also have serious effects on the nutritional 
status of large groups of people. The region is already charac­
terized hy serious nutritional imbalances for certain groups. 
Malnutrition is common among infants, especially pre-schoolers.
One recent survey in Jamaica, for example, indicated that "Below 
1 year of age over ')(j per cent of infants received less than the
calorie intake recommended by FAO, and over 80 per cent received
10/less than the recommended protein intake." More general
evidence shows that severe infantile malnutrition is common in 
hospitals; that there isa high death rate in children under four 
years; that school children are under-weight and small for their 
age; and that low intakes of protein and calories are common among 
children and low in com e groups of adults.
The deteriorating economic situation of peasants and rural 
proletariat was instrumental in promoting rapid rates of rural-
17/urban migration and of external migration throughout the region.— ' 
Peasants contributed significantly to the massive wave of external 
migration during the 1950? s. Sale of land provided the wherewithal 
to go abroad, The economic circumstances of the rural proletariat 
prevented external migration so they contributed chiefly to the wave 
of migrations to towns and cities. But the pace of urban industrial 
advance was not sufficient to accommodate them and many lacked the 
skills in any case. And so the growth of urban slums, of petty 
thefts, of prostitution and other urban social ills are associated 
with that change.
14/ During I974 there were numerous occasions when housewives 
battled in supermarkets in Jamaica in order to secure some of the 
available supplies of basic food staples.
15/ J.C. Waterlow, Observations on Nutritional Conditions in 
Jamaica (mimeo, CENI, IJ.W.I» 1973).
16/ Ibid, p. 102,
17/ The evidence on this and more extended dicussion of the 
phenomenon is presented in a later chapter on "Demographic Change 
and Consequence" (see Chapter IV ) .
14/
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Changes in the economic circumstances of the peasant reverber­
ate on other sectors, The marketing of peasant output is carried
1S ̂on by higglers. —~' And peasants buy consumer goods and farm inputs
from shopkeepers. Furthermore, there is a substantial transportation 
network in the movement of produce.
Overall, the new modernizing sectors of West Indian economy 
advanced at the expense of peasants and consumers. The main 
beneficiaries are those who managed to secure relatively high wage 
employaient,
Mining creates a virtual * aristocracy of labour*. In addition 
to high wages, labour in that sector is. well organized and manages
to secure benefits (including wage increases) because labour costs 
are such a small share of total costs. But over time, labour
19/displ acement occurs as technology changes. — ' Mining developments
have also created company towns where segregated housing is typical.
In some eases, segregated schools etc., exist as foreign companies
feel obliged to provide foreign personnel with schools for their
20/children. Jamaica is a case in point. — ' White expatriate personnel 
enjoy positions of privilege in these localities and in the wider 
society. Race and colour stratification create social tensions and 
i n s tab 11 j ty.
The public sector gained from mining developments. Increased 
revenues facilitated the expansion of the bureaucracy which has 
come to occupy a prominent position in most of these economies.
The size of the public sector does not however reflect its capacity 
to influence change, as later discussion indicates.
16/ Referred to in some places as hucksters, etc. These are 
usually women who purchase from farmers and retail to consumers in 
a network of public markets.
12/ According to R.D. Thomas, there is at present inadequate 
provision for displaced workers in the Trinidad petroleum industry.
See Thomas, op. cit.
20/ A mining company town in Jamaica is described by nationals 
as Johannesburg, indicating that the nature of housing and living 
conditions resemble those of the apartheid system of South Africa.
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The main impact of manufacturing has been its influence on 
female participation rates. Light manufacturing activity opened up
job opportunities for women, thus adjusting the profile of the urban 
working class. The share of skilled labour in the work force also 
increased as manufacturing developed. The ’blue collar’ worker is 
now an important element in the occupational structure of the four 
more developed countries of the region —  particularly in Jamaica 
and Trinidad-Tobago.
Tourism carries with it the good and the bad. The net contri­
bution to foreign exchange is more often than not positive. And 
employment is created, for both males and females. However, the 
type of advertisements used by publicity agents encourage visitors 
to expect a kind of subservience which West Indians are no longer 
(if ever) willing to accept. The fact that visitors are white and 
that West Indians serving them are black accentuates the problem.
As well, tourism is associated with certain social vices like 
homosexuality, prostitution, and gambling. And the demonstration 
effect of ’visitors* patterns of expenditure adjust the tastes of 
West Indians more and more toward imported consumer goods.
Overall, the new activities (mining, tourism and manufacturing) 
have affected the social structure by accentuating race, by adjust­
ing the occupational composition of the labour force, by changing 
the rural urban composition of the population, and so on. Further 
discussion of these will he presented in later chapters.
On the political economy of change, it is to he noted that the 
main economic changes reinforced the already dependent nature of 
West Indian economy, long associated with plantation agriculture. 
With foreign ownership, with activities that have few internal 
linkages, and with a legacy of taste for imports, these economies 
are characterized by the phenomenon of producing what they do not 
consume and of consuming what they do not produce. To put it more 
elegantly, there is a marked and widening gap between the structure
- 49 -
of domestic demand and a structure of domestic resource use. — *
This creates a situation of both functional and structural dependence.
Brewster's statistical analysis of the interrelationship 
between a number of functional variables for the Trinidad economy 
found no significant correlation between the manipulable variables 
of the economic system. When there is no correlation between wages, 
prices, exports and employment in an export economy it is impossible 
for government to plan. And he concludes that if governments are 
unable to plan they must appear to do so. Consequently, resort is 
made to symbolism, whereby symbols are created to give the impression 
that governments are planning. Such symbolism involves the 
proliferation of planning type agencies (e.g. Development Banks, 
Marketing Boards, Industrial Development Corporations) which expand 
the bureaucracy even further; hut which have no real effect in 
transforming these economies from a condition of dependent 
underdeve 1 opinent »
2l/ Havelock Brewster, Economic Dependence •—  A Quantitative 
Interpretation, Social & Economic Studies, March 1973»

C H A P T E R  IV

- 50 -
DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE AND CONSEQUENCE
This chapter considers the growth of population and the 
components of that growth; changes in the labour force in terms of 
its quantity and quality; and the question of race and class in 
the contemporary situation.
Emigration and Change ^
Given the patterns of economic change described earlier, it is
hardly surprising that emigration has been a dominant feature of 
population change. The past few decades witnessed sharp declines in 
mortality and protracted high levels of fertility. But migration 
drastically dampened the picture. The largest wave of emigration 
began in the early 1950*s. This movement to the United Kingdom was 
terminated with the British government’s legislation of I962 (the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act). Subsequently, the movement was to 
Canada and the United States hut this movement was more selective 
in terms of skills. It constituted a 'brain drain' which critically 
affected certain sectors in the West Indies. For example, health 
services were affected by migration of nurses and doctors.
The pattern of population change is shown hy the data in 
Tables 1 and 2. Total population of the region rose from 2.7 millions 
in 1943 to 4.3 millions in 1970. Average annual increase of population 
for all 14 countries in that decade amounted to 56,000; Jamaica, 
Trinidad-Tobago and Guyana account for most (87%) of the increase. 
During the first intercensal period (I943-I960) annual rates of 
population growth were highest for mainland Belize and Guyana, over 
3%. Trinidad also ranks high with 2.9%. Jamaica shows a moderate 
1.6% while population declined in Montserrat (l.1%) and Turks &
Caicos Islands (0.4%).
Emigration played an important part in these changes. Apart 
from Trinidad-Tobago, Guyana and Belize, emigration is a high
l/ Data in this section are derived from G.W. Roberts,
'Working Force of the Commonwealth Caribbean at 1970 —  A Provisional 
Assessment' (U.W.I., Dept, of Sociology, mimeo, 1974).
Table 1 : Population Movements in Commonwealth Caribbean Countries 1943-6 to 1970





































Jamaica 1,237,000 1,609,800 1,848,500 21,900 23,870 32,890 53,520 10,990 29,650 33-4 55-4
Trinidad & Tobago 558,000 828,000 940,700 19,290 11,270 18,680 24,050 - ú 10 12,780 -3 ,3 5 3.I
b'li V 31161 369,700 560,400 701,900 13,620 14,150 13,550 19,450 _  n~?Q 5,300 -2.0 27,2
Barbados 192,800 232,300 237,700 2,820 540 4,170 4,260 1,350 3,720 j2.4 87.3
Sel isse 59,200 90,100 120,900 2,210 3,080 2,230 3,830 20 750 0.9 19.6
Ft.. lucía 70,100 86,100 100,900 1,140 1,480 2,020 3,100 880 1,620 43 «6 52.3
Grenada 72,400 88,700 93,900 1 , 160 520 2,280 2? 37O 1,120 1,850 49 cl 78.1
St. Vincent 61,600 79,900 87,300 1,310 740 2,130 2,750 820 2,010 38.3 73.1
Dominica 47,600 59,900 70,500 880 1,060 1,320 1,260 440 960 33-3 7 6 .2
St. Kitts-Nevis 41,200 50,900 45,600 690 - 530 1,320 1,260 63O 1,790 47.7 142.1
Montserrat 14,300 12,200 11,700 - 150 - 50 23O 210 380 26O 165.2 I23.8
Cayman Islands 6,700 7,600 10,500 60 290 140 220 80 - 70 57.1 -31.8
British Virgin Is. 6,500 7,900 9,800 100 190 200 200 100 10 50.0 5.0
Turks &. Caicos 6,100 5,700 5,600 - 30 ~ 10 130 140 160 150 123.I I0 7.I
TOTAL. 2,743,200 3,719,500 4,285,500 65,000 56,580 81,090 117,380 15,090 60,780 19.8 51,8
* The Censuses of Jamaica, Cayman Islands and Turks and Caicos were taken in 1943» 
For all other countries the Census year was 1946.
Source; G.W. Roberts, Ibid.
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Jamaica 1.56 1.39 34.5 39 a 11.6 8.2 22,9 30.9
Trinidad & Tobago 2.86 1.28 37-4 3 5.O ] 0.7 7.8 26,7 27.2
Guyana 3.01 2.28 41.0 38.5 12.0 7.7 28.9 30.8
Barbados 1.24 O .23 32.6 27.0 13.0 8.9 19.6 18.1
Belize 3 .O5 2,98 40.5 43.5 IO.9 7.2 29,6 3 6 .3
St. Lucia 1.48 I.6O 40.8 43-4 I5 .2 IO.3 25.6 33 a.
Grenada 1.46 0.57 4 1 .5 35.4 13.4 9.4 28.1 26.O
St. Vincent 1.88 0.89 44.8 43.9 14.9 11.0 29.9 32.9
Dominica 1.66 1.64 40.8 41.4 I6 .3 10.4 24.5 il *0
St. Kitts-Nevis 1.52 -I.09 39 = 0 37-7 1 3 .5 11.6 25.5 26.I
Montserrat -I.13 -0.42 3I.2 28.5 13.6 10.9 17.6 I7 .6
Cayman Islands O .74 3.29 33-6 29.8 9.4 5.5 24 a 24.3
Br„ Virgin Is. 1.40 2.18 40 a 29.4 II.9 6.8 28.2 22.6
Turks & Caicos -0.40 -0.18 39.0 35.4 16.1 10.6 22.8 24.8
Source; Ibid.
- 53 -
percentage of natural increase —  in excess of 33$ in ail cases, and 
rising to 123% for Turks and Caicos and 165$ for Montserrat. For the 
region as a whole emigration was 20$ of total natural increase.
Between i960 and 1970 emigration again is a dominant factor.
For the region as a whole net emigration is 52$ of natural increase.
And in St. Kitts (142$) Montserrat (124$) and Turks and Caicos (107$)
emigration exceeded natural increase leading to declines in population.
In four countries, Barbados, Grenada, St. Vincent, and Dominica net
emigration was between 70 and 90 per cent of natural increase. And
in three countries -- Jamaica, Trinidad-Tobago and St. Lucia net
emigration was just over a half of natural increase. ’’The estimated
loss by the entire region of 1 .1 2 million during the ten years
following i960 is equivalent to nearly one-third of its population
at i960, which shows the extent to which rates of growth have been
2/curbed as a result of the prevailing rates of emigration." —'
Emigration not only affected rates of change in population but 
its composition as well. According to Roberts;
It is clear that the movements have been strongly age 
selective, affecting for the most part persons within the 
age range 20 - 34 .... that postwar outflows have involved 
smaller proportions for males (relative to earlier periods)
.... the major effects of which have been to curb the 
growth rates of populations and of the expansion of working 
populations and of women of child-hearing span. 3/
That emigration affected females more than males in the age range 
15 - 44 reduced the number of women of child-bearing span than would 
otherwise be the ease. And the age selectiveness of emigration 
materially affected the growth of the labour force. Indeed, as will 
soon he observed, a decrease in the labour force was the result.
Emigration has other important effects as well. It accounts 
for the growing importance of remittances from abroad, contributes 
to the brain drain; and affects ideas about change. Migrants remit 
funds from abroad to support relatives still at home, and to save
2/  G.W. Roberts, Ibid, p.6.
3,/ Ibid, p.8 .
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and/or invest. In some oí the smaller territories, remittances 
represent the only substantial inflows of capital from abroad.
Even in some larger territories, annual remittances represent a 
significant share o í  inflovs. Data for Jamaica, f o r  example,
indicate that in several years remittances exceed inflows of private 
investment c a p i t a , . ! . »  The importance o f  remittances f o r  a  large 
country l i k e  Jamaica can be judged from the effects on the balance 
of payments *
The positive balance in respect of transfer payments has 
been an importaut i s c tor in moderating the extent of the 
deficit on current account. Net receipts from private 
tr ansfer payments increased steadily from, the mid-fifties 
to a peak o f  J|;1d.‘2 million in I 9 6 3 .  The key factor in . / 
this regard ves the growth in remittances from migrants.
The $16.2 million r e c o r d e d  in I903 is to be compared with a net
inflow of $19 million private capital in a year when investment
5/in bauxite expansion was heavy.
Apart from balance of payments considerations, remittances 
represent a major explanatory factor in the survival capacity of 
the major dispossessed groups of West Indian populations over the 
past few decades. The persistent high levels of unemployment and 
generally low levels of income of those employed could not be 
sustained by the internal propensity to share (noted earlier). It 
is clear that remittances contribute a certain measure of stability 
to the unstable socio-economic conditions of these societies.
Migration of skilled persons in the second wave of movement to 
the USA and Canada during the i960 * s has serious repercussions on 
West Indian economies. The significance of this aspect is high­
lighted by the following evidence for Jamaica. Table 3 provides 
some data on the skill structure of migration between I 9 6 6  and I968. 
’Service, sports and recreation workers’ comprised the bulk of
4/ Owen Jefferson, The Post-War Economie Development of Jamaica 
(Kingston. 1972) p.211.
5 /  With completion o f  ALCOA’s project, See preceding chapter.
workers, about one half. The other half chiefly consists of 
’proíessiana) and technical*, ’clerical", and 'craftsmen, production 
process workers’. These three categories represent critical 
elements in the labour needs of any modern econom y.
Concentrating on ’professional and technical* category alone, 
Girling has observed that whereas 3 out of every 25 members of the 
Jamaican labour force are in, this category, ] out of every 6 
emigrants were» He estimates that it costed Jamaica some J$9 
million to produce these trained emigrants; and that income fore­
gone as a result of the loss of these persons is about I per cent of 
6 /the total GNP.
Finally, emigration affects the social system by its impact on 
the leadership profile, the seepage of outside cultural influences, 
and the ideas for change developed abroad by returning migrants.
It can reasonably be argued that potential leadership for change is 
not likely to be found among emigrees because leaders tend to remain 
on the battlefield. But the political history of the West Indies 
indicates that most of the present and past leaders spent some time 
overseas in one capacity or another. Analysts have associated the 
movement toward political independence with the return home of many 
figures —  Garvey and Cipriani, for example. How important recent 
migrations will he in shaping the future policy is difficult to 
assess.
What is certain is that the exposure of migrants to metropolitan 
culture has a distinct demonstration effect on ideas for change and 
on tastes. The experience of black people living in white metro­
politan society certainly facilitated the transmission of Black 
Power ideology from North .America to the Caribbean during the i960 * s; 
and returning migrants display consumption patterns which influence 
the consumption aspirations of others in the society.
6/ R.K, Girling s The M i g r a t i o n  of Human C a p i t a l  f r o m  the Third 
World; The Implications and some data o n  the Jamaican Case, Social 
and Economic Studies, March 1974, pp. 92-94.
ble 3 : JAMAICA HUMAN CAPITAL MIGRATION (Girling)
9 6 6 1 9 6 7 1 9 6 8
t U.K. Total U.S. C anada U.K. Total U.S. C anada U.S. Total
) 1,357 403 1,777 2 9 1
3 110 J Í 150 15
3 686 555 1,347 407
6 83 49 146 39
6 501 528 1,117 499
1 66 144 111 26
8 4,152 575 7,798 453
,6 694 106 1,078 54
>0 237 7,649 2,397 235 10,281 13,524 1,784 164 15,472
17 6,622 2,834 1,962 -4 CO •vj 10 11,768 3,946 1 . 102 4,476 9,524
07 6,859 11,009 10,483 3,459 8,1 0 7 22,049 17,470 2,886 4,640 24,996
MIGRATION TO U.S. AND CANADA - 1967-1968
1 9 6 7 1 9 6 8
Total fo Of Workers Total $ o f Workers
1,760 I7 . 5 2,068 I3 .5
kers 147 1.5 65 1.1
1,241 12.4 1,754 11.5
I32 I.3 185 1.2
1,029 10.2 1,616 10.6
210 2.1 137 0.9
4,727 4 7.I 8,251 53-9
800 8.0 1,132 7.4
10,046 15,308
K. Girling "Migration of ’Human Capital* - Jamaican Experience" 
eial and Economic Studies, March 1974, p. 93»
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Effects on the Working Force
Emigration was instrumental in adjustments in the size and 
composition o f the working force. Table 4 presents data on the 
working force for i960 and 1970. Substantial reductions in the work 
force are indicated, especially for females. Only Belize and the 
Virgin Islands show any increase in the total working force. The 
Virgin Islands are a transit stop for prospective migrants to the 
U.S. Virgin Islands so that represents a special case. For the 
region as a whole, the total working force declined by 12$ between 
I960 and I97O. Whereas, the male component declined by 7$ the 
female component declined by 22$.
Roberts has provided estimates which isolate the effect of net 
emigration on changes in the male component of the working force.
7/The following tabulation shows these estimates.
Male Working force, 1()6 0 846,000





Total Accessions (1960-70) 350,000
Male Working force, 1970 785,000
It will he seen from these data that net emigration represents 
80 per cent of total accessions to the male working force over the 
decade.
Internal Migration
The rural to urban drift of population is yet another mani­
festation of the effects of economic change over the past few
decades. Those from the rural sector who could not afford to go
abroad drifted to the towns» as rural dispossession increased. Data
G.W. Roberts, op cit. p. 12.
Table 4 : Changes in Size of Male and Female Working Force for 
14 Commonwealth Caribbean Countries, i960 and 1970
C  ountry Male
Female
I 9 6 0
Both Sexes
i960 I97O *fc Change I960 I97O fc Change I970 f e  Change
J a m a i c a 3 8 1 , 7 0 0 332,100 -I3 .O 225,200 159,900 - 2 9 . O 6 0 6 , 9 0 0 4 9 2 , 0 0 0 -18.9
Trinidad &  Tobago 192,700 172,500 -10.5 68,400 57,200 - 1 6 . 4 2 6 1 , 1 0 0 2 2 9 , 7 0 0 -12.0
Guyana 124,500 128,900 +  3.5 36,700 30,100 -18.0 16] , 2 0 0 1 5 9 , 0 0 0 - 1.4
Barbados 50,200 51,000 +  1.6 OOOnPS 32,900 - 5.7 85,100 83,900 - 1.4
Belize 21,400 25,500 + 19.2 4,700 6,000 + 27.7 26,100 31,500 + 20.7
St* Lucia 18,200 17,200 - 5.5 10,400 9,300 - 5*8 28,600 26,500 '“5 *Z- Í -3
Grenada 15,200 16,100 + 5.9 10,000 9,800 - 2.0 25,200 25,900 +  2.8
St, Vincent 14,300 13,600 - 4.9 9,100 7,400 -18.7 23,400 21,000 -IO.3
Dominica 12,700 12,400 - 2.4 9,700 7,300 -24.7 22,400 19,700 -12.1
St. Kitts-Nevis 7,100 7,700 + 8.4 7,100 4,700 -33.8 14,200 12,400 -12.7
Montserrat 2 , 3 0 0 2,400 * 4.3 1,800 1,300 -27-8 4,100 3,700 - 9.8
Cayman Islands 3,100 2,200 -29.O 900 1,200 + 33-3 4,000 3,400 -I5 .O
Br.Virgin Islands 1,700 2,800 ¡-64.7 400 1,000 +I5O.O 2,100 3,800 +81.0
Turks & Caicos 1,200 1,000 -16.7 900 500 -44.0 2,100 1,500 -28.6
TOTAL 846,300 785,400 - 7.2 420,200 328,600 -21.8 1,266,500 1,114,000 -12.0
Sources Ibid (Roberts)
- 59 -
on internal migration for the region as a whole are not readily
available; studies have been carried out only for Jamaica and 
8/Trinidad-Tobago. —/
One example from Jamaica gives some idea of the importance of 
internal migration for specific localities. Within a 12 month period:
In the parish of St. Elizabeth the number of 
registered live-births exceeded the number of deaths by 
approximately 3 »350» while the loss of population through 
internal migration amounted to 2,632 persons. So that 
79% of the natural increase of population was exhausted 
by intensive out-migration. On the other hand, to the 
natural population growth of the parish of St. Andrew 
amounting to 4,400 persons that year, there was added a 
migration gain of 1?»500 persons, so that the natural 
population changes amounted to only 20.1% of the total Q / 
population growth of this parish during the same period.^
St. Elizabeth is a distinctly rural parish while St. Andrew is part 
of the metropolitan capital city of Kingston-St. Andrew. Overall, 
the pattern of internal migration in Jamaica has been towards the 
capital city but in more recent times with the development of 
mining and tourism, a drift towards rural towns has been noted.
A similar trend is noted for Trinidad-Tobago; there "urban and
11/suburban areas received 64.1 per cent of the total immigration". — '
Figures 1 and 2 show the patterns and intensity of rural-urban 
migration in Trinidad-Tobago and Jamaica, respectively. These 
flows can be seen to be very substantial. Internal migration 
varies with levels of education. In Trinidad-Tobago 9*3% of movers 
had no education, 76.1% had some level of primary education, while 
those with secondary and higher education accounted for 14.6 per 
cent.
& / See Kalman Tekse Internal. Migration in Jamaica (Jamaica 
Dept, of Statistics, April I967) and Joy M. Simpson, Internal 
Migration in Trinidad-Tobago (U.W.l,, I.S.EAR. Kingston, 1973)*
9/ K. Tekse, Ibid, p.l.
10/ G.W. Roberts, Démographie Aspects of Rural Development in 
Jamaica, Social and Economic Studies, September I968.
ll/ Joy M. Simps on, op. cit. p.18.
I 2/ Ibid, p. 20.
« H .K U K lN  Sl*tvAttS
*3-
i jnJ I oAÎ) fV\Ap>
S ’cnj ■Í̂ .j>jr>x ; (Vt .^ Trtw.Xa^ £ U C Í  t ^
PORT OF SPAIN .ANO StBLRBS I«0 *
1*
FIG. 2
1.003 W0RAKT5 MIGRATION INTO THE KINGSTON 
a  ST ANDREW AREA FROM THE 
COUNTRY 1959
TOWN P L A N N I N G  D E P A R T M E N T  
in fo rm ation  Dep? o t S ta t is t ic s  
Dole  No* 1966
'0 9 0 lOmlt
Source: Kalman Tekse, Internal Migration in Jamaica (Jamaica Department of Statistics Bulletin)
Kingston, Jamaica, i960.
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In a study of the causes of internal migration in Jamaica,
Nassau Adams concluded that distance and wage income differentials
■between regions are " o f  overwhelming importance in explaining the
l l /pattern of migration" f o r  a d u l t  males. Migrants are most
definitely attracted to areas where wage incomes are higher and 
distance s e r v e s  as a cost deterrent to migration. That study a l s o  
showed that the rate o f  unemployment and the degree of industrial­
ization i n  t h e  region o f  o r i g i n  were s i g n i f i c a n t  f a c t o r s ,  a s  were 
t h e  a v e r a g e  .-rims o f  l a n d  holdings a n d  t h e  l e v e l  o f  education in the 
d e s t i n a t i o n  region. I t  is of interest to n o t e  that the unemployment 
rate i n  the d e s t i n a t i o n  r e g i o n  does n o t  s e r v e  a s  a major deterrent 
"the implication being t h a t  p e o p l e  are attracted t o  the high wage
regions in the vague tope of being able to get a job, even if in
14/practice the p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  succeeding is n o t  very great." — ' "The 
average size of land holdings also appears to he of some significance, 
at least w h e r e  the destination region is concerned, regions with
15/larger average holdings tending to he shunned by migrants”. — '
T h e  r a p i d  rates of rural-urban migration have far-reaching 
s o c i a l  structural consequences. Urbanization without industrialization 
results in growing urban unemployment. The problem of urban housing 
becomes acute, and slums develop. Other s o c i a l  amenities in the 
urban a r e a s ,  a l r e a d y  inadequate — • health facilities, schools, etc.
-- become further pressed. Demand for food supplies in urban areas 
increases as a result; and, as noted in an earlier chapter, food 
supplies are retarded by the movement away from agriculture. The 
fact that migrants are usually younger persons means that extra 
pressure is p l a c e d  on certain facilities like schools. The tendency 
f o r  most of the e d u c a t i o n a l  and training facilities to be located 
in the capital cities and towns helps to accentuate the drift from 
rural areas.
15/ Nassau Adams, Internal Migration i n  Jamaica —  An Economic
. A n a l y s i s ,  S o c i a l  a n d  E c o n o m i c  S t u d i e s ,  J u n e ,  I969, p. 150.
14/ Ibid, p .  151
I S /  I b i d ,  p .  1 4 6 .
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West Indian people have a traditional bias against agriculture —  
at least agricultural wage work —  on account of the historical 
legacy of slavery. The accelerated rural-urban migration in recent 
decades serves to reinforce this bias. Accordingly we find 
evidence, in several countries, of an excess demand for labour in 
plantation agriculture while there is considerable urban unemploy­
ment. For example, workers have to he imported from St, Vincent 
and otiier neighbouring islands for sugar cane harvests in Barbados 
while open long-term unemployment in Barbados stands at 8$, and 
open plus "disguised" unemployment is estimated at 20$ of the 
labour force.
The Labour Force
The two components of the labour force for consideration here
are the working force and the unemployed. More data are available 
17/for the former., — '
.Roberts utilizes a three-fold classification of the working 
force in the West Iridies: government employees, non-government
employees, and own account workers. These data are presented in 
Tables 5 and 5a.
Non-government employees are the hulk of the male working 
forces 57 per cent for the region as a whole; own-account workers 
are 25/; and government employees, 18fo. The share of non­
government employees is highest in Cayman, Barbados and the Virgin 
Islands; and is lowest in Jamaica, It would appear that 'pure 
tourist* economies offer greater scope for private sector employ­
ment than other types of economies.
16/ Carmen McFarlane, The Employment Situation in Overpopulated 
Territories in the Commonwealth Caribbean, in Human Resources in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean fed. 1. Harewood; U.W.I. ISER, St. Augustine,
1970. Short term unemployment in Barbados is estima,ted as 12.2/,
17/ G.W. Roberts, Working Force of the Commonwealth Caribbean 
at 1970, o£, cit.
«
TABLE 5ï Size and Proportional Distribution of three categories of the Working 
Force for 14 Commonwealth Caribbean Countries, 1970 - Males

















Jamaica 37,000 177,000 118,200 1 1 .1 3 5 3.29 35.58
Trinidad & Tobago 50,100 99,000 23,500 29.05 57.34 I3 .6I
Guyana 26,900 75 <100 27,000 20,83 58.24 20,93
Barbados 9,500 37,500 4,000 18.56 73-59 7.85
Belize 3,800 14,100 7,600 14,81 55.48 29.71
St, Lucia 2,500 9,600 5,100 14.73 55.87 29.40
Grenada 3,400 9,900 2,800 20.81 61 .70 17.49
St, Vincent 3,400 7,500 2,600 25.39 55.17 19.45
Dominica 2,200 6,6oo 3,500 17.73 53.60 28.65
St, Kitts/Nevis >£" O O 5,300 900 18.68 69,09 12.23
Montserrat 6oo 1,300 500 23.80 54,40 21,80
Cayman Islands 300 1,700 200 I3 .9I 74.97 11.13
Br» Virgin Is. 400 2,000 400 13.45 70,80 1 5 .75
Turks & Caicos Is. 300 600 100 29.86 60.22 9.92
TOTAL 141,700 447,300 196,500 18.04 56.94 2 5.O2
Sources Ibid,
TABLE 5(a): Size and Proportional Distribution of three categories of the Working
Force for 14 Commonwealth Caribbean Countries, 1970 - Females
0ountry

















Jamaica 26,700 97,900 35,300 16.70 61.23 22.08
Trinidad & Tobago 15,300 36,700 5,200 26,75 64.16 9.O9
Guyana 8,400 17,100 4,700 27.81 56.62 15.56
Barbados 5,000 25,200 2,700 15-20 26.60 8.20
Belize 1,400 3,800 800 23-33 6303 I3 .3 3
St. Lucia 1,500 5,700 2,200 15.96 60.64 23.40
Grenada 2,100 6,100 1,600 21.43 62.24 16.33
St. Vincent 2,100 4 ,600 800 28.00 6 1 .3 3 10.67
Dominica 1,400 4,600 1,300 1 9.18 6 3.OI 17.81
St. Kitts/Nevis 900 3,200 600 I9.I5 68.08 12.77
Montserrat 300 800 200 23.08 6I.54 15.38
Cayman Islands 200 900 100 I6.6 7 75.00 8.33
Br. Virgin Islands 200 700 100 20.00 70.00 10.00
Turks & Caicos Is. 200 200 100 40.00 40.00 20.00




For own account workers, the largest proportion is reported
for Jamaica (36/) and the smallest for Turks and Caicos (10/) and 
.Barbados (8/). Relatively high shares are observed as well for 
Belize, St, Lucia and. Dominica. It would appear from this that 
there is some association between the size of the resource base and 
the opportunities that exist for independent economic activity.
But the evidence is far from convincing.
Government workers account for relatively high shares of the 
work force in Turks and Caicos, Trinidad-Tobago, St. Vincent,
Montserrat, Guyana and Grenada -- over 20/ in all cases. The 
lowest share shown is for Jamaica (ll/). Relatively poor colonies 
seem to offer greater scope for government employment than 
relatively well endowed ones. And among the independent countries, 
the more diversified the economy the less important is government 
as a source of employment, as a comparison of Trinidad-Tobago, 
Guyana, and Jamaica would seem to suggest. In the ’pure mineral* 
economy (Trinidad-Tobago) the scope for private sector employment 
is relatively small; and government has the wherewithal from 
mineral taxes and royalties to create public sector employment.
While in the highly diversified mixed economy (Jamaica), the scope 
for own account work is relatively great and government employment 
is therefore relatively small. Guyana is a less diversified ’mixed 
economy* than in Jamaica. Accordingly, it occupies an intermediary 
position.
Roberts notes some other interesting characteristics of the 
working force. Own account workers comprise "very small proportions 
of the work force at young ages and move up steadily through the 
age scale." In general, ”non-Government employment assumes more 
prominence among females than among males, and does not decline 
with age to the same degree as it does in the case of males ... 
Female involvement in own account category is generally lower than 
that of males.'
18/ Ibid., p. 15*
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I n  t e r m s  o x  educational attainment, we find that of the t h r e e  
categories of workers, Government employees have the highest status 
"for the r e g i o n  a s  a  w h o l e  only 8 $  of them have less than 5  years 
of formal s c h o o l i n g ,  w h i l e  t h e  proportions w i t h  GCE passes and with 
degrees a n d  diplomas axe c o m p a r a t i v e l y  high, S e i n g  12% and 5 $  
respectively.” O w n  account workers have the l o w e s t  status in 
educational attainment; ()2% of them in the region a s  a  whole have 
little more t h a n  p r i m a r y  schooling with o n l y  I f o  h a v i n g  d e g r e e s  o r  
d i p l o m a s -  22$ o f  o w n  account w o r k e r s  a r e  functionally i l l i t e r a t e  
( i . e .  l e s s  than. ’ 5 y e a r s  s c h o o l i n g )  a s  compared t o  1 3 $  t o r  non­
government and 8$ for government workers.
Unemployment is a critical factor in all West Indian countries; 
and what evidence there is suggests that unemployment increased in 
recent years. The data also indicate that the problem is greater 
among young persons than among older ones; also among females as 
compared to males. Carmen McFarlane presents the following data on
different types of unemployment in terms of p e r  cent of the labour
19 '
f o r c e  a s  a t  i 9 6 0 ;
Long Term Short T
Open Open & Disguised
Jamaica 9.2 2 3 . 4 I 3 . O
Trinidad-Tohago 5.6 1 5 . 6 1 0 . 7
Barbados 7 . 8 I 9-5 1 2 . 2
St. Lucia 1 0 . 0 I 7 . 5 12.1
Grenada 7-8 22.3 I 5 . 7
St. Vincent 6.2 22.8 I 3 . 5
Dominica 4.0 16.1 8.1
Antigua ii » à « lita» 12.8
Montserrat n.a. n.a. 12.2
The rates in I960 were a l l  above r a t e s  recorded at the preceding
c e n s u s  i n  the 1940’s. O t h e r  a v a i l a b l e  d a t a  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  e d u c a t e d  
persons a n d  y o u n g  p e o p l e  constitute a n  increasing share of the 
unemployed.
.19/ Carmen McFarlane, op. cit., p. 4— 10-
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Survey data fer Trinidad-Tobago indicate that the rate of 
unemployment was highest among persons who went to but did not 
complete Secondary School (20/) and among those who completed 
primary school but did not go further (18/). The unemployment rate 
was 6/ or 1 >ss for persons with no education and among those who had 
completed secondary .chool or attended university. In Barbados of 
the total unemployed. nearly 50/ had received seven years or more of 
primary • dues;tior. and only 8/ had less than 4 years education.
Yo m g  people suffer most from unemployment. In Trinidad-Tobago 
during I9 6 7, 28/ of the unemployed were under 20 years old and 25/ 
were 20-24. While 15/ of the total labour force were unemployed at 
the time, the rate for persons 15-19 was 34/ and for persons 20-24 
it was 23/. A similar picture is given for Barbados in I966. For 
that population as a whole the unenqployment rate was 13/ hut for 
persons 15-19 years old it was 32/.
It is clear that the problem of unemployment among the 
educated youth and youth generally is perhaps now at crisis 
proportions. The 5-14 age cohort at the 1970 census are now in the 
labour force. That group had increased from 2? to 31 per cent of 
the male population of the region between i960 and 1970; and for 
the female population from 25 to 29 per cent. It is therefore 
quite likely that the unemployment rate for persons 15-19 has 
increased materially during the 19 70’s.
The unemployed youth represent perhaps the most frustrated and 
volatile group in contemporary West Indian society. And with 
increases in the numbers involved would seem to be the most potent 
source for meaningful change.
20,/ These data are derived from Jack Harewood, The Under- 
Utilization of Available Human Resources, in Human Resources in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean (ed J. Harewood, U.W.l. St. Augustine, 1970) 
p. 5-18/19.

C H A P T E R  V
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POLITICAL SITUATION AND CHANGE
This penultimate chapter proceeds somewhat differently in 
concept and style from those preceding. (Any credit or failure in 
its results belong .rightly to Louis G. Lindsay.)
Since politics is "the arc of the possible", it seems to be 
necessary to begin normatively with precepts that derive directly 
and analytically from the society under scrutiny. So the opening 
section (l) will confront some aspects of the political economy of 
dependency - in their most obvious manipulative West Indian dimensions.
The basic normative premise is that people will do anything they 
can do to help themselves; that what they can do, i_s conditioned by 
what they think they can do; and that what they think they can do is 
determined by the particular process of socialization to which they 
have been exposed.
In. other words, "what is" is not necessarily ’what people think 
is* in the short run; and in the long run as well.
It will be seen, here, that the normative determines the 
positive and vice-versa, as well. Thus the particular political 
economy of dependency demarcates a particular character of political 
process and change (if indeed the path is not unique?).
The specific imperial policy determines the particular 
constitutional form and political process. Accordingly, the first 
section considers the influence of the British system based on the 
Westminster Model Change and continuity can he discerned in this 
discussion of Westminsterism and its political outputs in the West 
Indies. The particular type of political imitation generates a 
characteristic type of dependence which is explored in the second 
section. Alienation is the fundamental resulting situation.
The third section therefore outlines a specific model of social 
structural change integrating the basic elements of the social and 
political system. It provides the bare bones of a framework which 
is discussed in more detail in the final chapter.
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T l i e  W e s t  I n d i a n  p o l i t y  r e f l e c t s  the d e p e n d e n t  c h a r a c t e r  o f  a i l  
c o l o n i a l  s i t u a t i o n s  w h i c h  a r e  n o t  t r a n s f o r m e d  b y  r e v o l u t i o n .  T h u s  
w e  f i n d  g e n e r a l l y  s i t u a t i o n s  i n .  w h i c h  t w o  p a r t y  c o m p e t i n g  s y s t e m s
CHANGE AND CONTINUITY
country").
T h e  w h o l e  p o l i t i c a l  process n o w  e x i s t i n g  i n  t h e  W e s t  I n d i e s  i s  
b a s e d  o n  a n .  e l e c t o r a l  s y s t e m  i n  w h i c h  o n e .  two o r  multiple p a r t i e s  
c o m p e t e  e v e r y  f our-fi v e  y e a r s  for t h e  r i g h t  t o  *  g o v e r n ’ ,  C o m p e t i t i o n  
i s  g e n e r a l l y  b a s e d  o r . t  p r o m i s e s  t o  t h e  e l e c t o r a t e  v h c  are n e v e r  told 
how t h e s e  p r o m i s e s  a r e  t o  b e  f u l f i l l eh. In between t h e s e  f our-five 
year contests t h e  population do not i n f l u e n c e  d e c i s i o n  making. A n d  
t h e  e l e c t e d  ‘decision-makers’ tinker with a n  economic system which 
i s  e n t i r e l y  o u t s i d e  o f  t h e i r  control.
I m p e r i a l - c o l o n i a l  economic r e l a t i o n s h i p s  produce Imperial 
colonial po 1 it..1.ea 1 a ystems.
As J.E. Greene has indicated;
the political institutions which developed (in the 
West Indies) were essentially rooted in Imperial 
policy and were designed to execute that policy.
H e n c e  the colonial o f f i c e  in Britain c r e a t e d  t h e  
civil service apparatus ». as a system o f  
dispensing law, order and patronage. It a l s o  
transplanted the institutions for l o c a l  government
eld the substance of the
The consequence of withholding popular participation i s  general 
social unrest and turmoil w h i c h  art characteristic of a l l  W e s t  
Indian societies today.
In t h e  next few paragraphs we wish to consider t h e  relation­
ships between t y p e s  of W e s t  Indian economies and party politics. 
And to consider b r i e f l y  the kind o f  social unrest which i s  
manifested in the region from the I960*s up to t h e  present time.
l/ J.E. Greene, the Developmental Bases of Political Change 
in the English Speaking Caribbean. —  An Exploration Journal of 
Social and Behavioral Sciences, Summer 197’*.
h a v e  developed a f t e r  i ' b e  Westminster m o d e l  o f  B r i t a i n  (the " m o t h e r
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Green has presented a typology of West Indian poli ies based
on the number of political parties and tbeir persistence in the
2/political process. —/ He comes up with the following;
Two Party Persistent : Barbados, Jamaica, Guyana
Multiple Party Shifting s Bahamas, Dominica, St. Lucia
Grenada, St. Vincent,
Trinidad & Tobago, Antigua.
One Party Dominant : Belize, St.Kitts-Nevis (Anguilla)
Montserrat, Cayman, Turks & 
Caicos, Virgin Islands.
It is interesting to try to link the economic typology presented 
in Chapter II above with this party political typology. Figure 1 
makes this linkage. The association between types of economies and 
party politics in terms of the output of party types is not very 
clear.
One should expect to find more positive results than is 
revealed here; for example, Jamaica which is the most high "mixed 
economy" throws out a stable two party switching since 1944, with 
intermittent appearance and disappearance of third parties (from 
Millard Johnson to Lightbourne). Whereas the "mixed" (2 sector - 
3 sector?) economy of Guyana throws out a * dominant' one party with 
a ’dormant' second party —  Reference here are to PNC - PPP. It is 
not clear what intermediate position is held by Barbados; a 2-sector 
"mixed" economy - tourism and plantation. It would appear that 
these static pictoral presentations do not enough reflect differences 
in social structures. Hence an attempt must he made to bring race 
and class into the analysis.
In Figure 1, the "pure tourist" and "pure mineral" economies 
like, Bahamas-Montserrat; and Trinidad, are easier to follow in 
terms of the outputs of one party dominance in the party polities.
2/ J.E. Greene, Institutionalization and Change in Small 
States: Party Systems in the English Speaking Caribbean,
(Dept, of Government, U.W.I. mimeo, 1974) p.26.
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Clearly if everybody depends on one thing for a living, only one
3/patron can survive long in systems based solidly on patronage,
Carl Stone’s recent work provides empirical evidence of the
influence of race and class in the political process in Jamaica and
Greene and many others have analysed the impact of race on politics 
4/m  Guyana. —1
The common racial division in West Indian societies is between 
■white (the imperial coniiection) and non-white (the colonial side of 
the interaction). African people are the majority of the latter 
group for the region as a whole; they provide initial labour power 
under early imperialism. East Indians are important in Trinidad 
and Guyana where they represent some 40$ and over 50$, respectively 
of the total population. So for purposes of the analysis of race, 
East Indians figure prominently in those two cases.
For the region as a whole, then it is useful at one level to 
link Africans and East Indians as one group -- the hase foundation 
labour power. Both sets of people are categorized as ’’Blacks” in 
Figure 2.
The figure indicates that occupational mobility (and associated 
class position) of Black people is restricted. White people are at 
the top of the social hierarchy and other whitish minority groups 
(Portuguese, Lebanese, etc.) are close below them. Brown people and 
"certificated blacks" occupy an intermediate position between the 
whites and Blacks who are the majority of the population. Basically, 
the highest achieveahle position of hlacks is the bureaucracy which
3/ We are here considering contemporary (one) party political 
outputs in Bahamas (Pindling) ; Montserrat (the Brambles -- father/ 
son); and Trinidad (Williams). "Now" being party politics in the 
shifting situations of the I960’s and 1970*s. Shifting in terms of 
accelerating pace in the international capitalist polities-economies 
and West Indian reverberations.
See Stone, Race, Class Politics in Urban Jamaica (Kingston, 
I974) and his Electoral Behaviour and Public Opinion in Jamaica 
(Kingston 1974) and J.E. Greene, Race vs Politics in Guyana 
(Kingston, 1974).
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services the state apparatus. And since the state apparatus is in 
a dependent patron-client relationship with the imperial power, 
patronage becomes important for mobility within the neo-colonial 
system.
Government and politics are dominated by patronage? and the 
limited resources available to the state and the population 
constrains the opportunities for mobility. Accordingly, the 
characteristic pattern is increasing alienation.
For the region as a whole, then the fundamental characteristics 
of the polity is that of dependency♦ Dependency creates numerous 
problems at various levels of the social process and in different 
dimensions of social activity. It leads to alienation and 
generates the internal power for social change. An understanding 
of the syndrome of dependency is critical to particularizing the 
nature of West Indian alienation; and the consequence of that for 
social structural change.
West Indi an states are defined by the international community. 
It is the relation with the imperial power that determines each 
country’s rights in the world as a whole. Thus the present status 



























These distinctions in constitutional form have no importance, in 
fact.
All West Indian polities are dependent. And all produce the 
same results for the peoples of the region. Dependency generates 
myths, and symbols become the chief manifestations that fundamental 
change is being achieved. Myths are developed to maintain the
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Figure 2
Race, Class and Occupational Mobility 
in theEnglish Caribbean
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status quo ante. And symbols are manipulated to suggest to the 
population at large that better days are coming soon; and not 
’bye and bye’.
The myth of democracy is paraded in the style of Westminster 
politics to provide fantasies of popular participation for the 
population. Symbols are manipulated to show that developmental 
change is occurring right before the eyes of the people.
Myths, symbols and fantasies produce the seemingly magical 
result that * the more things change, the more they remain, the same’.
11 DEPENDENCY SYNDROME AND SYMBOLS
The economic substrae;ture gives shape to the political super­
structure. In dépendent economies where the structure of resource 
use is widely separated from the structure of peoples* demand, the 
manipulative powers of governing political authorities are reduced. 
Economic policy doers not generate expected results in the 
conventional manner o f independent capitalist economies. Because 
there are few links between the manipulable variables.
Table 5*1 provides some statistical evidence of the 
correlation between functional variables in the Trinidad economy.
In the analysis done by Brewster ^ , the evidence is that there are 
no significant interrelationships between these functional variables. 
Accordingly, he suggests that governments of such economies cannot 
solve pressing economic problems such as unemployment.
5/ H.R. Brew it er, Economic Dependence ... A Quantitative 
Interpretation, Social & Economic Studies, March 1973-
Table 5-1











1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. .684 -.277 • 128 .085 .633 .437 .379
2. -.684 .641 .245 .041 .019 .045 .689
3- -.277 .641 .120 .676 .236 .030 .292
4. .128 .245 .1201 -.321 .426 .261 .040
5. .085 .041 .676 .265 - .2 3 2 .226
6. • 633 .019 .236 .426 .265 • 519 • 133
7- .437 -.045 9 0 Vjl 0 .261 - .2 3 2 .519 .074
8 » .379 -.689 -.2 9 2 -.040 .226 .133 .074
Sources See text.
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"Prices cannot be kept down by operating on wages. 
Suppressing wage rises does not lead to increased exports; 
indeed, wage acceleration seems to go along to some 
extent with increased exports. Increased exports do not 
make for increased employed; indeed, there is even an 
inverse relation between them. Effectively, the level of 
employment cannot he manipulated by any of the recognized 
functional relationships of orthodox economic practice.
As a result, although the solution of unemployment is the 
prime government economic responsibility it continues to 
grow larger from year to year.
Thus the most important area of economic policy is premised 
on economic relationships which seem to he non-existent but 
which are nonetheless supposed to he administered through a 
standard range of institutions - The Plan, the Planning 
Department, the Central Bank, the Industrial Court. The 
lesson is that the economic inter-relationships to which 
economic dependence leads cannot he rectified through 
instruments of technical policy since they are underpinned 
by the society’s real transactions with the external world 
and with its internal sections.
THE SYMBOLISM OF DEPENDENCE
The economic and racial consequence of economic dependence 
are discussed in many places. Attention is now focused on 
certain symbolic responses to dependence. Since the 
political leadership of underdeveloped nations, with one 
or two exceptions, has apparently not considered it in 
its interest to discuss, publicly, fundamental notions and 
goals of development, significant sections of the populations 
of these countries have come to believe that the symbols of 
development constitute in themselves development.
This kind of symbolism has given rise to new psychological 
blockages to development, particularly in radical-type 
governments, which may he more difficult to remove than
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the physical and political obstacles. For this reason, 
it is considered useful to point to the nature and 
origins of dependence symbolism. My analysis is based 
on personal observation and on close contact with 
political leaders and senior civil servants over the 
past fifteen years. Their responses to the inefficacy 
of policy under conditions of economic dependence must 
be viewed against a political background in which the 
prime concern and expectation focus on socio-economic 
change.
First, there is an agonizing period of discovery which 
shows up that, within the existing framework, virtually 
all the available instruments of policy are ineffectual.
If a government cannot manipulate the instruments of 
policy, because they do not work it must pretend to do 
so - if it is unwilling or unable to alter the real 
transactions upon which they are premised.
Second, a predictable cluster of institutions develop, 
whose very physical presence is projected as the living 
symbols that governments govern. Central Banks, Local 
Commercial Banks, Planning Units, Industrial Courts, 
Tourist Board, Marketing Boards, Industrial Development 
Corporations, State Trading Agencies, etc., flourish but 
do they function? It is not much of an exaggeration to 
say that if these were all closed down it would have 
little or no real effect upon what actually takes place. 
Factories are built but do they produce? Nationals 
participate in the international corporations. And 
there are the corresponding postures; of activity, 
dedication and technological up-to-dateness. Eventually, 
all this gives way to a sober self-contempt. Since this 
third stage cannot he openly expressed, its characteristic 
is a retreat into relative seclusion, and sometimes even 
the contemplation of relinquishing office.
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In the fourth stage, deceit and self-contempt combine to 
undermine the whole fabric of government, political and 
official. There is a realization that nothing is being 
done, nor can be done under existing circumstances, and 
the sham deteriorates into wide-spread corruption. A 
purge of selected elements then comes, often as a survival 
measure. This fifth phase is the stage of idolatry.
There is a messianic flavour about it and indeed heroes and 
saints may actually be created at this time. Attempts are 
made to refurbish the civil service and there is a great 
posturing of religiosity and moral strength.
It furnishes the more mature frame of mind which is one 
of self-delusion. The main characteristic of this sixth 
stage is the elevation of compromise into a theory of 
achievement. Gradualism, solidity, responsibility are 
the concepts abroad at this time. Postures are rationalized 
on the basis of their pragmatism. And the new ideology 
dismisses criticism of its real deficiencies as unattainable 
idealism. In this stage, great emphasis is placed on pomp 
and protocol. They serve, in effect, by intimidation to 
emphasize an imaginary distance in status between believers 
and non-believers. The syndrome is complete when self- 
delusion becomes a psychopathological state of identification 
in which symbolism actually becomes realism. Dependency 
may now he legitimized in -negotiated' economic contracts, 
'associate5 agreements and meaningful participation 
whose word-imagery and quasi-legality are actually taken 
as conferring a relationship of equality and independence 
upon a situation which, in reality, is not." ^
To get the full import of what Brewster is saying above, the 
reader must read his full article. That is particularly important
6/ Havelock Brewster, Economic Dependence - A Quantitative 
Interpretation, Social and Economic Studies, March 1973, pp. 9^-95.
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in today’s misconceptions about separating structure from function. 
Depending and dependent are of course two different matters, as
Brewster clearly demonstrates in that article.
I am trying here to follow that path somewhat by suggesting 
that my stylized transactions matrix for 'Caribbean-type economy1 
in Chapter II defines structural dependence and therefore defines 
the functional dependence that Brewster describes for Trinidad 
empiro-statistically. It would seem to follow that if you cannot 
govern you must play like you can in order to maintain some self 
respect (or you disintegrate as a whole). The latter is the 
’political economy of alienation' described in the next section.
The psychopathological stage that Brewster describes above 
comes from, and causes, the nonsense of "snow on the eanefields"
(GCE *0* Level English composition) the positive insight of 
Sparrow’s "Dan is the Man in the Van"; and the resultant ’fantasies 
of popular participation’ in West Indian polities. -y
When one begins to examine microscopically what passes for 
"education" (what is and what people 'think' is are different) in the 
West Indies and what passes for government in the West Indies (here 
’what- is’ and ’what people think is* needs deeper scrutiny), then 
the germs begin to appear. For example, we might begin to under­
stand links between material poverty and technology (so-called 
scientific). ^  The links between material poverty and spiritual
escapism in certain expressions/forms of established worships in
9/Churches of England and of Rome.
7/ The last little phrase is coined from Louis G. Lindsay work 
on ’Myths’ (in process); and of 51 or any percent participation in 
dealing with the "Mothers". I think Lindsay’s forthcoming Maternal 
Symbolism will elaborate the last point.
8/ Why, for example, does the University of the West Indies 
have 20 or so physicists studying the ionosphere and 2 animal 
scientists trying to provide more milk and meat for malnourished 
children?
9/ Consider here the links between the Church of England and 
Monarch of England who is the (motherly) titular head of West Indian 
States.
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Consider as well the revealed preference for West Indian people 
to go to the balm-yard. for spiritual upliftment; even after waiting 
on scientific doctors for hours on end (or because) and when 
scientific psychiatric resources are simply squandered on middle 
class disorders like alcoholism? It must, of course, be of some 
real scientific significance that alcoholism in Bahamas is second 
only to France and just above the Trinidad East Indian in the whole 
wide world.
It would appear that in the whole wide world, the West Indians 
rank highest in drinking and emigration. And in cricket sometimes, 
depending on mood.
111 ALIENATION AND CHANGE; OUTLINES OF A MODEL
Social alienation in the West Indian case derives from the 
particular deep roots in the international capitalist system. White 
foreigners from Europe-USA capture and still control the basic 
resources of these societies —  i.e. the true wealth. Black people 
provide the bulk of the labour power and brown people dominate the 
intermediary layer between these two groups. Small minority groups 
occupy the most powerful position, internally. Jews, Chinese, 
Portuguese, Lebanese etc., control enough resources to exploit the 
labour of Black people. They and local whites are the internal 
agents of imperialism.
The dialect of the West Indian social situation is explored 
here in an examination of the action-reaction and interaction 
relationships between groups of West Indian peoples and the 
characteristic modes of production and exchange that govern their 
daily lives. The analysis is intended to explain the rumblings of 
structural change which are now being clearly heard in different 
parts of the region. These rumblings are similar to those of a 
volcano.
10/ This statistical information was communicated to me
verbally by close medical supervisor at the UWI in recent 
conversations (1975).
- 83 -
Figure 5.3 on the following page shows the basic elements and
2l/their interrelationships.— ' The kernel is the white imperialism of 
Europe and the U.S.A. And there is an outer kernel (broken line 
circle) comprising Jews, Chinese, etc. Alienation intensifies in 
the downward direction. Black people suffer most. Integration 
intensifies in the upward direction, schematically, towards the 
older industrial societies of Europe and the older cultural societies 
like China and India. The older cultural/industrial society of 
Africa does not provide any basis for sublime integration.
The geo-historical origins of West Indian societies are 
critical in explaining their integration with the capitalist 
international. And the socio-psychological results of alienation 
of the majority of the population are the omens of structural change.
Suppression and repression of Black people are inevitable 
in the circumstances. The reaction to suppression and repression 
is intensified struggle by the oppressed for liberation. Thus the 
social situation has a volcano appearance when viewed upside down.
The struggles of oppressed blacks must eventually blow the kernel 
out, in order to create a new social equilibrium in which the 
majority of peoples will have access to sufficient resources for 
a better existence.
Social turbulences in the West Indies during the late 1960fs 
and 1970*s reflect the rumblings of the dynamic model. The urban 
uprisings in Jamaica of I968, the aborted palace revolution and 
black power outbursts of Trinidad in 1970, up to the "Dread Law" 
of Dominica in late 1974 are examples of a general phenomenon.
Rasta and black power ideology have gained an ascendancy in 
the process of reaction of Black people to the oppression of white 
imperialism. The Westminster-Washington "mother type" imperialism 
which filtered out the geo-historical origins of the African people 
produced the ideology of Rasta and Black Power as a reaction. Action
ll/ This diagramatic presentation was inspired by a discussion 
with Trevor Moo.
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to contain tnat xn the present neo-colonial phase is legislation of 
the type represented hy the Gun Court Law in Jamaica and the 
"Prohibited and Unlawful Societies and Associations Act, 1974" of 
Dominica. ■^/
Reaction to this recent legislative acts of repression will be 
intensified organization by Black people to struggle for liberation. 
Meanwhile, significant numbers of minority groups emigrate in fear. 
Although they are numerically unimportant these groups control
considerable capital. These groups have played a critical part in 
the process by which Black people are screened through the filter 
indicated in Figure 5*3»
The white filter is a plan to fool black people that integration 
upwards is truly possible.
It is not.
Yellow and High Brown concentration around the white kernel are 
significant at the West Indies f> level!
Yellow people will either ho-long-a-long or flee the scene.
Those who flee the scene emigrate to new horrors which they never 
dreamed of before and seme will return indeed. But, again on what 
terms? -—  their parents-ancestors from People8s China or US China? 
Ying Yang and I-Ching do not provide very specific answers. All we 
know is that there is something old and good about "I-Man Ching".
But how many of the billion plus Chinese in East China practice it 
is anybody’s guess. Guess me this riddle and perhaps not!
The West Indian Chinese either occupy Governor1s residences, 
or sell salt fish, or emigrate, or "run racket". In each of these 
cases they must compromise to white rule.
Even if they take to the people, street-yard, the problem 
remains one of patron-elient. Guitar with friends is not far 
removed from trusting Miss Chin. And Miss Chin is not far removed
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from Kings House. And people still need salt to eat food - fish, 
mackeral, or dat?
For white people produce the salt, Kings House, guitars, and 
fish and racket. So aitso. Racketeers get cut down or run away to 
nothingness.
And nothing from nothing leaves nothing!
Nutten from nutten lef nutten (JA).
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OMENS
Like the dependent economy, the dependent analyst must shake 
out the constraining psychic influences of alienation. Accordingly, 
the language of this concluding Chapter of Volume One is West Indian.
It is being asserted chat contemporary rumblings in the West 
Indies today are a sign of future changes in the social-structural 
basis of the society. In that direction the chapter attempts to 
explain the significance of these rumblings. The politics of 
"dread" is chosen as a ease study.
Political leaders are attempting marginal changes of securing 
more revenue to dispense patronage in order to alleviate the 
economic plight of the population. As well, cultural adjustments 
are being promoted. And new symbols of change are introduced in 
the rhetoric of the electoral elites "democratic socialism" and 
"cooperative socialism" in Jamaica and Guyana, respectively.
The deepening crisis in the international, capitalist system 
immediately erodes short-run gains in revenues, through inflation. 
Symbols of participation by elites in providing labour power for 
development are invented but "kareba dressed middle class men 
moving stones in the hush provide but a moment of comic relief in 
the life of suffering peasants."-^
The Kareba type of symbolic reform is a reaction to the dread 
like action of Rasta, itself being a reaction to the oppression of 
Westminster style imperialism. The dynamics of West Indian social 
structural change is manifested in this type of adjustment at the 
cultural level. Government participation in resource ownership, of 
various types, are reformist attempts to alleviate material 
suffering, on the economic level.
Race and class are prominent in the manifestations of the 
dynamics of change. It is instructive, therefore to return to the 
discussion of the model of change presented in the preceding chapter.
1/ L.G. Lindsay, Colonialism and the Myth of Democracy in
Jamaica (U.W.I., ÏSER, mimecTT^T^T*
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Positive omens of change are to he detected there by those who 
understand the West Indian social scene, as elaborated in this study.
1 THE CONTRADICTIONS ^
Each group in West Indian society acts, reacts and intereacts 
with other groups in a game where the most oppressed must live hy 
their wits,. Structural change i s  blocked 'by manipulative devices
of the ruling elites.
Novi one-end-one can mek two or eleven, depending on how you 
place one and one. Thats what the High Brown West Indian man thinks, 
of course. But who determines the pjacings of one and one. Hence, 
the result!
So, if Chiny smart and brown man think him smart BLACK MAN 
have fe outsmart de two-o-dem. So "Aaancy** is born and is credited 
—  legitimated, whatever you wan call it!
But ‘credit* and * legit* are strictly speaking the language of
white aian. SO BLACK MAN IS CAUGHT IN THE KERNEL OF THE FILTER!
He becomes frustrated, alienated. He kicks against the pricks 
and is clean bowled - Back to the pavilion. Whose pavilion. Either 
aluminium roof, or zinc sheet, or canvas tent top, or bamboo curtain. 
To do what? Him c’yan bat again. ,No sah.
So black man emigrate, like Chiny man. And hrown man and chiny 
man stop half way in newer métropoles. Miami, Toronto, and so.
Or in West Indian TAX HAVENS!
. TAX HAVENS - for little girls., Without them what would little 
boys do?
But ’métropoles* are considered to be older civilizations.
Some consolation. ARE THEY?
2/ The style of discussion here reflects the influence of 
Edward Brathwaite, Contradictory Omens (Savacou Publications,
Mona, 1974).
C H A P T E R  VI
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Oldness does not necessarily provide anchor,
8a drifting i s  posstWe,
ALIENATE!) HIGH BROWN West Indian and Chiny man in new 
métropoles is no change,
BIACK MAN hardly KNOWS M A T  AFRICA IS THE OLDEST CIVILIZATION, 
But that is only one-half of the story. For even when he knows he 
does not really believe, be has to argue the ease and hide.
He is taught that Africa is backward-jungle-drum-beating
natives. And that natives contaminate! So avoid the natives. Yet 
the natives of England contaminated the English West Indies to 
"Carib-bean”
Notting-Hill is not Miami-Beach-front-desk-tourist clerk. And 
Atlanta is hardly South Side Chicago. Nor is San Francisco for 
that matter near the South-Side and Harlem -
Notting-Hill Blacks are returning VEX now.
HÂRHM BIACK .MAN then (Garvey) aid NOW.
Man will come and man will go hut BIACK MAN LIVE FOREVER,
Sum and substance is that cultural exposure alone is no 
substitute for volcano-revolution.
If West Indian man can only see and act-out that "SUM AND 
SUBSTANCE” volcano must erupt!!
INSTANT RESULT!
Now the West Indian East Indian is a curious kettle of fish. 
Most are from India-Hindu. Fewer are TAMILS-MOSLEMS. Tamils are 
black people and mo s I eras don’t drink and smoke - The West Indian 
coolie man is therefore in a hind of "perpetual aliénation”. He 
must do the hardest back-breaking work in the sun plantations or 
don't drink or don't smoke, whichever option is taken, he remains 
unsure of himself and hsv to make the next move. To find passage 
money to India hard, HARD HARD.
India far and money Jiard to come by. So grow vegetables bard 
and send yu pickney them to medical school in new métropoles. Or 
cut sugar c a n e ,  drink w h i t e  rum and tumble down. But drink and 
tumble in quiet - not in Carnival where everybody can s e e  yu.
Who c a n  do daí for h o w  l o n g  without d e a t h  c i r r h o s i s ?
So t i i e  W e s t  I r i d i a n  East I n d i a n  e x p l o d e  i n s i d e  h i m s e l f     l i k e
an i n t e r n a l  volcano. Or Os m u s t  p r a y  " p s e u d o - w h i t e -style i n - w h i t e ™  
m o s q u e s " .  F o r  salvation. M a n y  o f  t h e  l a t t e r  n e e d  s a l v a t i o n  a f t e r  
s k a n k i n g  i n  " f a k e "  I n d i a n  h a b e r d a s h e r i e s  a n d  other Indian-West- 
Indian f a k e  l i k e  writing Missus Queen English,
The lowest Indian E a s t  Indian who is high c a s t e  from East or 
W e s t  i s  w h i t i s h .
Whitish not "whitey". So h e  is caught in the intermediate 
grey of the model in ' F i g u r e  5*3«- Geo-historical roots are 
incapable of a n c h o r i n g  submarine I  R E S U L T  - Volcano!
how to a n  e x a m i n a t i o n  of the dimensional shape o f  t h e  
downside-up tunnel-filter in Figure 5.5-- The volcano end has the 
only opening. The other end is insecure for stability and for 
maintaining internal pressure. So internal pressure blows through 
the o p e n  end!
Ded or dread; and so we .must come n e x t  to c o n s i d e r  West 
Indian DREAD.
THE POLITICS O F  DREAD IS DREAD. Simple as dat!
1 1  T H E  P O L I T I C S  O F  "DREAD"
Dread is a terminology u s e d  by certain s o c i a l  groups in 
J a m a i c a  a n d  Dominica. These groups are but o n e  e x p r e s s i o n  of the 
action of proletarian a n d  lumpen groups in the West Indies- in 
retent years. The reaction of governments throughout has been the 
introduction o : i  r e p r e s s i v e  l e g i s l a t i o n .
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Dread, means frontal assault on material dispossession to 
survive both materially and spiritually. Accordingly we need to 
consider the material side of dread and the spiritual side of 
dread.
The material side of dread is related to certain basic human 
needs like right food right time.
But food alone is not full human dignity even at the right 
time. The human dignity of dread then is to live as free as anyone 
likes without mashing up the brother. But the system stops the 
"stop mashing up the brother-sister."
So spiritual dread must withdraw. To negativeness or to come 
back again. The more positive dread will come back again —  either 
in direct spirit or flesh.
For spirit and flesh live together. You can’t have one without
the other.
So the politics of dread means positive change. And that is 
the only West Indian interpretation of the word Dread.
Dread is not locks. Dread is change up everything. Change up
everything is revolution because sometimes not even you own mother 
know yu.
So Dread is revolutionary politics that must be funnelled to 
blow out the white kernel and free the mind totally. To liberate 
the resources of society. And thereby to liberate the people from 
bondage.
Official reactions to the politics of dread is the following 
type of legislation enacted in Dominica,
Dread as Action of Liberation
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1. This Act may be cited, as the PROHIBITED AND uNLAtt'FÜL SOCIETIES 
AND ASSOCIATIONS ACT, 1974,
2. In this Act unless the context otherwise requirea, "Association" 
means any group or body of persons, sharing common 'beliefs, 
practices, and ideologies, who unite either temporarily or 
permanently to achieve a common objective; Minister means 
Minister responsible for security, Police Force includes 
members of the Royal Dominica Police Force, the Special 
Constabulary and the Defence Force; Society means any group
or associations of persons intended to be permanent or long­
standing, formed for the purpose of sharing and propagating a 
common ideology and objective, whose members distinguish 
themselves by a uniform, or by their mode of dress and manner 
of wearing their hair.
3. Any Association or Society, whose members -
(a) plan, conspire or attempt to affect adversely public 
safety and order; or
(b) practise acts of terrorism, including shooting at or 
injuring a member of the Police Force, Defence Force 
or Rural or Special Constabulary, or of the Public, 
thereby undermining public order and public safety; or
(c) threaten or intimidate any public official, magistrate, 
judge of the court, member of a jury, any other person 
by reason of being a witness or likely to be a witness 
in any proceeding under this Act or employee in an 
essential service; or
(d) by the destruction of any cultivated plant, forest tree, 
root, fruit, vegetable production, animals, buildings
or by the unlawful occupation of lands with acts of 
violence prevents the peaceful enjoyment of rights over 
propei1 ty ; or
(e) assault, beat, wound, hinder or prevents other persons 
from enjoying freedom of movement, or association on 
the grounds of their economic status, class, social 
background, ra.ce-, place of origin, colour or rel igious
persuasion; or
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(f) plan, conspire or attempt to affect public health by 
tampering with or fouling or poisoning water supplies,
or in any manner to deprive the publie of other- 
essential supplies; or
(g) entice or coerce children and young people under the 
age of 18 to join their membership, thereby preventing
their attendance at school; or
(h) are required to take any oath or engagement not
required or authorised by law; or
(i) are required to keep their names or the names of any of 
them secret frota the public at large ; or
(j) shall have any committee or select body so chosen or 
appointed that the members constituting the same shall
not be known by the society at large; or
(k) the names of which as well as the names of any president, 
treasurer, secretary, delegates or any other officers 
shall not be entered into a hook for the purpose, and 
to open to the inspection of all members of such society 
or association;
is hereby declared an unlawful association or society.
4. Any person who incites, aids, abets, counsels or procures by 
any means whatsoever, the commission of any offence under this
Act shall he guilty of an offence.
5. Nothing contained in paragraphs (h), ( i ), (j), (k) above shall 
extend to the meetings of such societies or Lodges as the Free 
Masons, the Foresters, the Oddfellows and like Societies that 
have been in existence before the passing of this Act, and 
whose Secretary shall establish to the satisfaction of a 
magistrate that the Society or Lodge is being run in conformity 
with the rules that regulate such societies.
6. Any person who is, or becomes a member of an unlawful 
association is guilty of an offence against this Act.
7. Any member of an unlawful association who appears in public
or elsewhere wearing any uniform, badge, or mode of dress 
or other distinguishing mark or feature or manner of wearing
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their hair, shall he guilty of an offence and shall be 
arrested without warrant by any member of the police force.
8. (l) A member of any unlawful association arrested under the
provision of the preceding section shal I not be entitled
to or granted bail.
(2) A member of an unlawful association arrested under the
provision of the preceding section shall be brought before 
a magistrate within 48 hours, Saturdays, Sundays and 
holidays excepted,
( i )  Any p e r s o n ,  M o ,  h a v i n g  b e e n  a r r e s t e d  u n d e r  any o f  the 
provisions of t h i s  Act and who escapes, mid any person 
or persons who aid and abet such person or persons to 
escape, shall be e q u a l iy guilty of an offence against 
this Act and on summary conviction shall be sentenced 
to a term of imprisonment of 18 months,
9. It shall be an offence to harbour or recruit in the membership
of any unlawful society or association any child or young person 
below the age of 18 years.
( b ) On convietios. of an offence under this section, a magistrate 
shall impose a sentence of two years imprisonment on a
person so convicted, and may order the young person to 
resume schooling.
10. It shall be an offence against this Act to harbour* or conceal 
any member of.' an unlawful society wanted by any member of the 
police force to encourage support, conspire with, aid and abet, 
any unlawful society or association or any member thereof in 
the furtherance of any of its objectives or in the infringement 
of this law.
Provided that the presence of a member of an association or 
society designated, unlawful, in the home of his parents will 
not in itself make the parents guilty of an offence under 
this section.
11. NO PROCEEDINGS EITHER CRIMINAL OB CIVIL SHALL BE BROUGHT OR 
MAINTAINED AGAINST A M  PERSON OHO KILLS OR INJURES ANY MEMBERî 
OF AN' ASSOCIATION 0.R SOCIETY DESIGNATED UNLAWFUL: WHO SHALL
BE FOUND ANY TIME OF DAY OR NIGHT INSIDE A DWELLING HOUSE,
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12. (l) À member os' the police force may arrest without
w a r r a n t  a n y  p e r s o n  w h o m  h e  h a s  r e a s o n a b l e  c a u s e
t e  s u s p e c t  t o  h e  a  member o f  an u n l a w f u l  s o c i e t y .
\ 2 )  A  m e m b e r -  o f  t h e  p o l i c e  f o r c e  m a y  w i t h  a  w a r r a n t ,
i s s u e d  i v y  a  m a g i s t r a t e  o r  J u s t i c e  o f  the P e a c e  s o
e n a b l i n g  h i m  t o  d o ,  w i t h  p r o p e r  a s s i s t a n c e ,  e n t e r  
a n y  h o m e  A y  f o r c e ,  a n d  b r e a k i n g  o f  d o o r s  i f  
necessary, and s e a r c h  t h e  s a m e  i f  h e  h a s  r e a s o n a b l e  
c a u s e  t o  s u s p e c t ,  that a  member o f  a n  unlawful 
s o c i e t y  o r  a s s o c i a t i o n  m a y  b e  h i d i n g  t h e r e i n  a n d  
m a y  s e a r c h  o t t e r  p l a c e s  a n d  p r e m i s e s  n o t  u s e d  a s  
a  home w i t h o u t  warrant,  w h e r e  h e  h a s  reasonable 
c a u s e  t o  s u s p e c t  that a  member o f  a n  uni awful 
s o c i e t y  or a s s o c i a t i o n  may b e  found.
( p )  N o  p r o c e e d i n g s  e i t h e r  c r i m i n a l  o r  c i v i l ,  shall be 
b r o u g h t  a g a i n s t  any member of the Police Force for
any a c t i o n  t a k e n  i n  p e r f o r m a n c e  o f  his duty(ies) 
under t l i i  s  A c  t  *
1 3. A Society or association might appeal from the decision of 
the Minister who designated it an unlawful society or 
association to t h e  high C o u r t .
(b)  T h e  M i n i s t e r  o r  the s o c i e t y  o r  t h e  a s s o c i a t i o n  may 
a p p e a l  a n  a  p o i n t  of l a w  f r o m  t h e  decision o f  a  
J u d g e  o f  t h e  H i g h  C o u r t  - o f  t h e  Court o f  A p p e a l .
14. The Society o r  Association, designated in the Schedule to
t h i s  Act i s  hereby declared an unlawful society o r  
association.
1 5. (l) The Minister may by regulations -
(a) a d d  to t h e s e  acts in section 3  t h e  commissions 
of which shall . m a k e  a  s o c i e t y  o r  a s s o c i a t i o n  
unlawfuli
(b) a m e n d ,  a l t e r ,  o r  a d d  the namea o f  o t h e r  
societies or associations to tae Schedule o f  
this Act;
( c )  p r e s c r i b e  anythiu . %  w h i c h  ' u n d e r  t h i s  A c t  f a i l s  t o  
b e  prescribed;
( ë . )  generally m a k e  provisions f o r  t t i e  c a r r y i n g  o u t  
oí the p u r p o s e  o f  this A c t .
(2) Any subsidiary legislation made under paragraph (b) 
oi the preceding sub-section shall, be subject to 
ne gatire re solution.
16. Persons shall be tried summarily for offences against this Act, 
and if found guilty shall suffer the penalties set out in the 
following section.
37» A magistrate before whom anybody is convicted for being a member
of an unlawful society or association shall impose a sentence 
of nine months imprisonment in. ease of a first conviction, and 
of one year i n  case of a second.
(2) A person convicted before a magistrate for harbouring 
or concealing & member of an unlawful society or 
association, or of aiding, abetting, counselling or 
advising such a sociexy or association shall be 
sentenced to a term of imprisoximent for one year.
(3 ) A person guilty of an exfence against this Act for 
which no penalty is prescribed, shall be given the
sentence set out in subsection 1 of this section.
SCHEDULE
(section 12)
That society or association of persons commonly called the DREADS
The right of appeal against conviction, and more discretion for 
the magistrate of the penalty for a first offence were amended.
The Act received the unanimous legislative approval for it’s 
sanction as law ..........
Ill OMENS
Legislation of the type described by the Dominica Act is an 
omen of official reaction to the positive actions of Black people
to change the system.
Such reaction is bound to stimulate further action for systemati 
change.
Omens of such concrete action are not yet in view at the time
of writing.
The Dominica ease is only an example of a general West Indian 
phenomenon it the mid-1970's.
The dialectic of action-reaction of this type will continue to 
be played out on this basis during the rest of the 1970’s and into 
the 1980’s.
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